Canadian Railroads > Leaving a train or equipment unattended

My guess based on grapevine information is that these instructions will come into sharp focus in the next few hours.

(CP instructions, paraphrased for clarity)

Equipment, with or without locomotives attached must be properly secured when set out at a location where maintenance staff are not employed.

Air brakes alone MUST NOT be relied upon to secure equipment at such locations, sufficient handbrakes must be applied and tested.

The pressure maintaining feature on the controlling locomotive MUST NOT be relied upon to maintain air brakes on the train.

At change off locations, where the control of the locomotives and train is handed off to other qualified staff, unless the control of the locomotive is handed over immediately, a qualified person must remain in control of the train until relieved or the train is properly secured.

I have experience in this scenario. Working on a two person crew, my conductor became very ill and was transported to hospital about half way through our tour of duty at a mid point on our run (he later fully recovered).

I was instructed that a relief crew was going to be some time in arriving and if possible to secure the train. I separated the locomotives from the train (interesting procedure when working alone) and applied the required number of handbrakes. I then recoupled the locomotives to the train and pumped off the air brakes and tested that the handbrakes were effective. I then again uncoupled the locomotives and secured them. This took some time, and every half hour I was required to report to the RTC on my status because I was working alone. I should point out that I was an "Engine Service Brakeman" when working, hence qualified both as an engineer and conductor.

Just as I finished the task, a crew bus arrived, not with a relief crew but with a conductor to secure the train had I elected not to secure the train myself. Also, all other trains on this double track portion of the railway were instructed to contact me by radio when passing my train. Once it was determined by others I had secured the train, I was relieved of duty and joined the conductor in the crew cab.

On other occasions, when working a yard engine, I would "babysit" trains awaiting a crew by sitting at the controls so that the switch crew would not have to apply and test handbrakes.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 07/08/13 12:50 by eminence_grise.

I'm not well schooled in air brakes, so I will ask.......I thought that maintaining the air pressure in the trainline was to keep the brakes off and the reservoirs charged, as opposed to maintaining a set on the brakes?

How does the brake system behave if the trainline is maintained at a constant pressure (presumably less than the pressure that would cause a release) after a reduction that sets the brakes?

A railroader friend told me recently (before the wreck, and far from the MMA) that maintaining the air in an unattended train was done in part so that the incoming crew could rely on the previous crew's brake test paperwork, which saved them doing a new brake test when they got on the train. Don't know if that has relevance here, just saying.

- Paul



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 07/08/13 11:17 by crs1026.

Interesting.

My friends outside the railroad industry sometimes betray a belief that working as a conductor/engineer must be simple, or mindless. I have to explain to them that although there are long periods of waiting and "normal operation", the real value-add is that a good engineer/conductor is always thinking and monitoring the situation to manage risk.

I think there are parallels to the military here, which is why railroads do so well hiring military veterans.

Your explanation of what you had to do when your conductor got sick is an excellent example... all of your experience and dedication really paid off that day, in a rare situation.

This is extremely valuable, and a very good reason to pay T&E employees well, to attract people who are smart, pay attention and care.

But dang, it is so hard to expect people to get it right every time.

In the Lac Megantic wreck, I'm going to speculate that there was an accumulation of risk factors:
- DOT-111 cars that rupture too easily
- parking a train at the top of a hill with insufficient handbrakes / assuming air will not be lost
- leaving a high risk train unattended
- insufficient awareness that crude oil can explode (I had no idea that crude oil could explode like this, I thought it'd just burn.)

Risk management in complex systems, especially those that include humans, is quite an art.

As one very articulate TO member pointed out, this was preventable, and railroads would do well to manage the risk themselves; if outside regulation is required, it will undoubtedly be heavy-handed and inefficient.

Perhaps railroads should audit each other. It takes someone knowledgable, but from the outside, to see / flag these situations.

eminence_grise Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> sufficient handbrakes
> must be applied and tested.

There's a "gotcha" just waiting to happen. If the train stays put, "sufficient" handbrakes must have been applied. If not . . . Is there any guidance as to what a sufficient number of handbrakes would be? If not it's a big judgement call on the part of the crew.

wlankenau Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> eminence_grise Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > sufficient handbrakes
> > must be applied and tested.
>
> There's a "gotcha" just waiting to happen. If the
> train stays put, "sufficient" handbrakes must have
> been applied. If not . . . Is there any guidance
> as to what a sufficient number of handbrakes would
> be? If not it's a big judgement call on the part
> of the crew.


Most railroads have a guide in their timetable about how many brakes should be applied on a particular descending grade in a certain territory. Personally,I think he should have tied at least twenty..but since he was working alone, on short time, there is the possibility he was unable to tie everything down, release the brakes to see if they held, then set the brakes again before the hogs got him.

The thing that gets me though, is the fact the air bled off...that should not happen on a fully charged brake pipe unless it had help. If the air had leaked down, the brakes would have gone into emergency first, then the reservoirs would have bled off...all that would have taken considerably longer than one or two hours....

I am curious why you didn't just dump the train, leave it in emergency, tie hand brakes and pump up air to see if they held without the uncoupling from the train part? Is that part of CP rules about securing a train? It's been awhile.
JB

wlankenau Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> eminence_grise Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > sufficient handbrakes
> > must be applied and tested.
>
> There's a "gotcha" just waiting to happen. If the
> train stays put, "sufficient" handbrakes must have
> been applied. If not . . . Is there any guidance
> as to what a sufficient number of handbrakes would
> be? If not it's a big judgement call on the part
> of the crew.

Prior to an earlier incident at Yates AB, "sufficient" handbrakes was up to the knowledge and expertise of the crew, following that incident "sufficient" is based on instructions from the railway, specific to the consist of the train involved, and grade characteristics at the set off location. To ensure the train is properly secured, the train air brakes are released and a "pull test" is made with the locomotives after the handbrakes have been applied. If the train moves with handbrakes applied, more handbrakes will be applied.

Stated simply, if you are going to leave the train unattended, make sure it is secured with handbrakes and will not move. This is a Canada wide transportation rule and is the responsibility of the crew. All crews have received extensive instruction on this requirement. Simply stated, a person must remain at the controls or the train fully secured by handbrakes when awaiting a recrew at locations other than a staffed railyard.

3rdswitch Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> I am curious why you didn't just dump the train,
> leave it in emergency, tie hand brakes and pump up
> air to see if they held without the uncoupling
> from the train part? Is that part of CP rules
> about securing a train? It's been awhile.
> JB


That is all about the "pressure maintaining" feature. With the locomotive seperated from the train, (or at least the brake pipe disconnected), there is no external source of brake pipe air to alter the condition of the train air brakes. This was soon after the earlier runaways, so the railway and myself were being super carefull. Also, this was the first "single crewmember in charge of a train" following the passage of regulations allowing that to take place. The train in question did not have DPU or RCO capabilities. (just an empty train of potash cars).

The hours of service regulations in Canada refer to "in control of a train", as in the engineer operating the controls or the conductor overseeing the operation. The securing of the train is not seen as an activity "in control of a train" and crewmembers are expected to properly secure the train before being relieved of responsibilty, even if their hours of service have been exceeded.

This is a point of contention between railway management and the unions and the employees they represent (USWA represents MM&A employees). The railways like to keep the train moving right up to the expiration of hours of service, the employees claim that they should stop the train and secure it prior to expiration of hours of service.

In the Megantic case, the stop at Nantes was a scheduled event, not necessarily involving hours of service.

As to the air brakes bleeding off, I agree that in normal circumstances air brakes can be relied to hold the train for "up to 14 hours, but don't rely on it, or quote me on it " to quote a long retired and very experienced air brake instructor.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 07/08/13 12:48 by eminence_grise.

See this:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/08/us-train-idUSBRE96505L20130708

Is Ed Burkhardt correct in his statement about the air brake system and no running locomotive to charge the brake pipe?



Allen



Edited 4 time(s). Last edit at 07/08/13 13:25 by bradleymckay.

crs1026 Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> I'm not well schooled in air brakes, so I will
> ask.......I thought that maintaining the air
> pressure in the trainline was to keep the brakes
> off and the reservoirs charged, as opposed to
> maintaining a set on the brakes?

It's not that simple. What that keeps pressure on the brake cylinder is equalization between the pressure in the auxiliary reservoir on each car and the brake pipe. Leakage can cause all or both of these pressures to be diminished. If all the air leaks out of both the pipe and the reservoir, the car has no brakes (except for the handbrake).

For a good description of the basics of freight train air brakes, see http://www.sdrm.org/faqs/brakes/history/. I'm not a railroad professional myself -- I'm sure eminence_grise understands all this WAY better than I do, but it takes more than a few words to explain it all.

> How does the brake system behave if the trainline
> is maintained at a constant pressure (presumably
> less than the pressure that would cause a release)
> after a reduction that sets the brakes?

The "pressure maintaining" feature of a modern brake valve referred to in some of the posts about this runaway maintains the pressure in the brake pipe after a reduction to keep the brake application constant. If you read the article referred to above, you will note that even a minor disturbance of the pressure in the brake pipe -- a slight pressure wave, for example -- can cause a release of the brakes. If the brakes are placed in emergency, and the brake pipe is left open to the atmosphere, this can't happen, but the remaining air holding the brakes applied will still leak off after awhile.

On a slightly different note, I believe that following a runaway on Beaumont Pass back in the '60s or '70s, the Southern Pacific implemented a policy that in addition to having hand brakes set, absolutely no equipment can be left standing unattended unless protected from entering a main track by a derail or a switch lined for other than a main track. This led to the installation of quite a few derails, as well as sometimes making it necessary for a crew member to stay on the engine when the rest of the crew went to eat. I wonder if this accident will lead to the implementation of such a policy in Canada.

D F W

I don't know the regulations and rules as eminence_grise does, so I can't speak to that knowledge.

I'm appalled that anyone would think that it's all right to set a train's brakes, leave an engine running to supply air, and walk away from the train to take rest, especially if the train is on a downgrade. For CEO Burkhardt to say that if the engine stops and the air brakes bleed off, there probably won't be enough handbrakes to hold the train is accepting liability, I think. If an employee leaves a train with the engine running, you have to assume that it will stop running. Someone could walk past and just push the emergency fuel shut-off button just to see what it does. A fuel filter could be clogged and shut down the engine. There could be faulty fuel and the engine would shut down. Anything could happen that could shut down an engine.

I've never heard of leaving an unattended train and using reliance on the air brakes to keep it in place. That's what wrapping on three or four or a dozen or two dozen handbrakes is for.

All of us only know what we see on the news, but there are a lot of questions coming out of this accident.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 07/08/13 13:53 by knotch8.

> you have to assume that it will stop running.

yes, especially a tired old C30-7

Crude oil will not explode. What will burn is the vapor off heated crude. My guess in this wreck is that the wreck caused something else , a auto with a gas tank or a propane tank used to heat a home or a backyard grill to explode and that fire then set the crude on fire. Even #2 fuel oil will not explode and a lit match thrown in a container will simply go out. If you vaporize it and light it it will burn. -----------Ken



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 07/08/13 14:00 by Kemacprr.

3rdswitch Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> I am curious why you didn't just dump the train,
> leave it in emergency, tie hand brakes and pump up
> air to see if they held without the uncoupling
> from the train part? Is that part of CP rules
> about securing a train? It's been awhile.
> JB

That really is not how it should be done. Having learned from experienced railroaders throughout the U.S., this is what I have seen done many, many, times:

1) Engineer makes a 20 psi set with the automatic brake valve.

2) Hand brakes are set on the number of cars that experience has shown works at THIS LOCATION.

3) The Engineer releases the automatic AND the independent brake valves, and the crew waits to see if the train moves.

4) If the train does move, then step 3 is repeated, and MORE hand brakes are set.

5) Eventually, enough hand brakes will have been set so that the train does not move after all air is released.

Firefighters have been instructed by the railways to activate the "Emergency Fuel Cutoff" button located on the side of the locomotive and in the cab prior to attempting to put out a locomotive fire, and if possible to enter the cab, open the knife switch in the electrical cabinet.

This in effect, isolates the fuel tank from the locomotive and shuts down all electrical systems on the locomotive. I believe the emergency fuel cutoff button is connected to all other locomotives in the consist through the m.u. cable.

In this case, the other locomotives may have been in RCL mode (remote control) but I think it likely that the firefighters would have pushed all the cutoff buttons to prevent further fire if it spread from the lead locomotive.

I'm sure the fire chief would have had all the locomotives shut down prior to sending in firefighters.

One witness report has the train rolling away very shortly after the firefighters extinguished the locomotive fire. The fire department did what they were supposed to do. How were they to know the train may not have been properly secured?.

Leaving rolling stock unattended in any "grade" territory for any "extended" period of time without DERAIL protection is unsafe, especially cars loaded with hazardous material.

Canadian Railroad Operating Rules (CROR) May 28, 2008:

112.
SECURING EQUIPMENT
(a) When equipment is left at any point a sufficient number of hand
brakes must be applied to prevent it from moving. Special
instructions will indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for all
locations where equipment is left. If equipment is left on a siding, it
must be coupled to other equipment if any on such track unless it is
necessary to provide separation at a public crossing at grade or
elsewhere.

(b) Before relying on the retarding force of the hand brake(s), whether
leaving equipment or riding equipment to rest, the effectiveness of
the hand brake(s) must be tested by fully applying the hand brake(s)
and moving the cut of cars slightly to ensure sufficient retarding force
is present to prevent the equipment from moving. When leaving a cut
of cars secured, and after completion of this test, the cut should be
observed while pulling away to ensure slack action has settled and
that the cars remain in place.

(c) Application of hand brakes must not be made while equipment is
being pulled or shoved.

> 5) Eventually, enough hand brakes will have been
> set so that the train does not move after all air
> is released.

Question: Is there a positive-feedback effect, where handbrakes provide less resistance once a train starts rolling?

It would be interesting to see a plot of resistance vs. speed for composite brake shoes...

think i'll google around...

eminence_grise Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
I believe the emergency fuel
cutoff button is connected to all other
locomotives in the consist through the m.u.
cable.

No, that feature/function is NOT trainlined. The Engineer can shut down ALL the diesel engines (prime movers) in his consist by pulling outward on the throttle handle and shoving the handle FORWARD (standard AAR control stand), but the "emergency fuel shut off" is NOT a "trainlined function" .