Railroaders' Nostalgia > Your train will derail...

I never had great career expectations. I learned from career train dispatchers who thought it was the best job one could get. I once heard that the president of the Reading, at one time a B&OCT train dispatcher, was talking to one of my colleagues and remarked that if he could go back to his B&OCT dispatcher seniority, he would. It was a better job than being president.

My goal every day was to come to work and run my railroad the best I could, and make that be better than the best I could yesterday. That drew the attention of a lot of management folks who, to a great extent, had a very negative reaction. That resulted in a lot of battles with management and a lot of malicious compliance on my part. Some management folks don't get it. The best thing for a manager who wants to climb the corporate ladder is a staff whose performance makes him look good. Nope; some folks seem to feel that the best way to make yourself look good is to make a point of claiming that everyone around you is an idiot and suppressing their activity to the highest degree possible.

In the mid 80s, the BN Seattle dispatching office was under the direction of a Superintendent of Transportation who did not like me at all, not one iota. He wasn't unique in that regard, but he was instrumental in this incident.

I was Portland Division day assistant chief. My domain was Spokane - Portland, Wishram - Bieber, Pasco - Ellensburg, and a myriad of branch lines in Washington and Oregon. Stampede Pass had been out of service. It would never, ever, ever, ever be needed or used again. Well...until the night that No 12 derailed and caught fire in the Columbia River bridge at Malaga, east of Wenatchee. That's right, IN. The bridge has a through truss span, which is inside of another through truss span, GN's tricky way of increasing the bridge load limit without interrupting traffic to replace the bridge. No 12 was a stack train. The articulated cars derailed in the bridge. The scraping metal caused sparks that started a tie fire that spread to the containers and back to the ties. It was ugly. It took air strikes to put out the fire. It took days for the hot metal to cool enough to start untangling the train from the bridge. It took months to repair the damage.

I had the misfortune of being the Pacific Division chief that night. The incident started the previous night with a practical joke. The chiefs were on a raised floor overlooking the dispatching arena. There was a wall of windows between the chiefs and the trick jobs. My colleague CNV, working Seattle East (Seattle - Spokane), came into the chiefs' office, stood next to me and said No 4 is in the ditch at Columbia River; the train's on fire. I answered in the old time dispatcher response naaawwwright. I ran a list of No 4, pulled the call list out of the drawer, picked up the chief sheet and a couple of pencils and headed for the door to the trick room to look at exactly what I had. That's when I noticed the glass wall lined with train dispatchers watching me. They wanted to see if they could get me excited/agitated. It didn't work and we all had a good laugh.

At the same time the next night, CNV came into the chiefs' office, stood next to me, and almost sheepishly said, Sorry about last night, man. It's real this time. 12 is in the ditch on the Columbia River bridge-train's on fire. We've got a list on my table. I don't know if dispatching is still that way, but it used to be that if there was a derailment, collision, runaway, or some such, dispatchers on other districts would start helping with getting a train list, marking hazmat in the list, making calls, etc. to help the guy who had the problem.

Here it was weeks later and I was on the Portland Division (I had a Pacific, Portland, Spokane relief job). I came to work and ran my cards. I had a stack of IBM cards a couple of inches thick. It was computer queries that would tell me the state of my railroad. There were yard counts by block and amount of time in the yard, there were block consist lineups, there were car orders, industry releases, locomotive reports. The railroad is a closed system. Almost everything is predictable. For that reason, my big, thick pile of printout included Northtown, Minot, Havre, Shelby, and Whitefish as well as Spokane and the rest of my domain. I could scan the printout, a couple of inches thick, in 30 or so minutes and have a good picture of what I needed to know more of and what could run itself or wouldn't make any difference. Several of us followed the same procedure every shift (and all dehorned ourselves to trick jobs by the end of the 80s, tired of the hassle of doing it right).

I noticed 5 Seattle trilevels in the yard at Shelby. Hmmm...why? I ran an inquiry. They were thrown out at Shelby for bad order of some sort. Now they were ready to go. Ok, lots of folks pick up repaired cars with a local of some sort, and bring them to a yard where they will wind up on a DOFT (Dirty Ol' Freight Train) going in the right direction (at least more or less). My philosophy was that repairs should be on the next appropriate train for the traffic. In this case, that would be 97, a super hot merchandise train. There was still hot boxcar traffic back then, such as Western Carloading, Superior Fast Freight, and Acme Fast Freight - stuff that goes in cans on stack trains now.  97 was a hot train and wasn't supposed to be delayed doing local work. I didn't see picking up cars that should be on 97 as local work. I knew that my colleague on days on the Montana Division chief didn't think so either.

I looked at 97 out of Whitefish. Sure enough, there were five trilevels on the head end. 97 was going to run via Stampede Pass. Trilevels don't fit through the Stampede Tunnel. I stuck out a wire to Pasco instructing the yard to pull the head five cars of 97 and forward them to Seattle on 691, the Pasco-Seattle via Vancouver merchandise train. That's it. Covered. Back to other things.

A while later, the Superintendent of Transportation came up to my desk in a rage. What do you think you're doing? 97 is NOT setting out at Pasco.

The head five are trilevels.

They are NOT. I instructed the trainmaster to throw away all of the copies of your ridiculous wire. We have a plan and you're not changing it.

Ok fine.

He stomped off.

I stuck out another wire to Pasco to C&E 01 097 xx (whatever date)

YOUR TRAIN WILL DERAIL AT MARTIN

EXPECT SEVERE SLACK ACTION AND A SUDDEN STOP

ENSURE ALL CREW MEMBERS ARE IN POSITION TO AVOID INJURY

Well....you think that got somebody's attention? The operator gave the message to the trainmaster, who called the Superintendent of Transportation, who ran to my desk at WARP factor 9.9.

What's the idea of that message to 97 at Pasco?

I don't want any of my guys to be injured.

By What!?

The wreck at Martin when the trilevels hit the tunnel and the train stops dead.

There are no trilevels on 97! I have the list out of Havre. You don't know what you're talking about so just stay out of it. We have a plan and we're sticking to it.

So do I.

What makes you think there are trilevels on 97?

They were at Shelby. Then they weren't. 97 was the obvious choice. Here's the list from Whitefish.

Why were you looking in the yard at Shelby?

To find stuff like this. I do that every day. (thumping my pile of printout)

These trilevels need to come off of 97. They can't go through the tunnel.

That's what I said.

Tell Pasco to take them off.

You do that. You've done a good job of convincing them I don't know what I'm doing.

He stormed off at the same high rate of speed at which he had arrived.

I went back to the minutia of the Portland Division.

The five trilevels went to Seattle on that night's 691.

TAW



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 01/19/16 12:54 by TAW.

Yay!  Another TAW story!  Worth the price of Trainorders with every story!

Lee Hower - Sacramento

    Yay, more TAW stories. Thanks for spelling it out, "My goal every day..."  I do the same thing in the engineer's seat, learn something today I can use in the future, do something better, or safer, less moves same work, etc. Too often for many others, it is just go on automatic and get through the shift. My 6 years of seniority Switchman told me today he is learning stuff all the time from my 10 years of seniority Foreman. You know,  the things they don't teach you in class, like how to switch cars! 
     More stories please! 

Thanks for another amazing story of management know-it-alls .  You would think they should have been grateful someone was watching the store.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 01/19/16 17:17 by tomstp.

I always enjoy your stories (not alone obviously); thanks!

Andy

I was on call when one evening I received a telephone call at home, advising that a troop train had been unable to stop in time and the engines and several cars had gone through the open Martinez Bridge (very high lift bridge on the SP in California). I was in shock for a moment as the ramifications of this began to flash in my mind. Then it dawned on me that we had not operated any troop trains for at least a decade plus this was the wrong guy to be notifying me. Better a practical joke than a real disaster.

Great story.

The huge difference between the railroad and other operations/manufacturing companies is that tremendous barrier between exempt and non-exempt employees, and there are non-exempt employees who are in a position to make important decisions that make the operation materially better or worse. In other industries, if the non-exempt employees have such decision responsibility, they are treated as part of the management team and they are delegated to and trusted by higher management, and their achievements make upper management look good. At the railroad, the layers of exempt management have that culture of teamwork and trust, but once the barrier of union membership is encountered, trust stops, teamwork stops, and the culture tries to turn the non-exempts into morons with no decision resonsibility (even if that is inconsistent with their jobs).

The UP had the wisdom (long before I joined it) to make all the dispatchers into exempts. So UP dispatchers were empowered and had much more opportunity to do good work and realize job satisfaction than their counterparts on the BN. My impression from afar is that Milw dispatchers were more empowered as well, even though they were non-exempt (union).

Best regards,

Rob L.

 

Rob L makes a good point, but before the UP Mop Merger the Mop Disprs were agreement and they were empowered to make operating decisions that now-days; only a non agreement or manager would make. The firewall between agreement and non agreement  is more pronounced at the lower level trainman, carman, clerk level.  It is also a matter of trust between the manager and his subordinates,  , I found that managers knew who they could trust to get the job done, and who they couldn't  Some people need constant supervision and some people are self motivators and can make decisions without them being told to. As one of my managers told me years ago " Do what you got to do get the job done."  

mopacrr Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Rob L makes a good point, but before the UP Mop
> Merger the Mop Disprs were agreement and they were
> empowered to make operating decisions that
> now-days; only a non agreement or manager would
> make.

Consider history.

Originally, the superintendent did the dispatching personally. That wasn't practical when railroads developed into 24 hours a day 7 days a week operations. The first train dispatcher was Andrew Carnegie, the superintendent's clerk. He was not what we would now call management, but he had the authority of the superintendent and was expected (after he demonstrated what could be done and created the position for himself) to act as such. Train dispatchers became sort of like warrant officers of the railroad: not management but not labor. They were unique in their role of assuming responsibility, making decisions for and issuing instructions in the name of the superintendent.The profession remained as such until the desire for one day off a week drove NP dispatchers in Spokane to form a union in 1918 (I have heard it said that thereafter, the superintendent said that he had no idea that they were so serious about a day off every week or he would have just arranged it instead of the dispatchers forming a union).

The union acted more like a professional organization than a union. Train dispatchers were still treated as professionals rather than labor, regardless of union affiliation. That's how it was when/where I started. Many railroads continued that into the 70s. Many other did not. It seems that by the late 70s, treating union represented train dispatchers like labor was almost universal. As an increasing number of railroads treated train dispatchers like labor, the union acted more like a union. Some railroads, Santa Fe and Union Pacific, for example, made a point of providing better conditions for the train dispatchers than those on union railroads. The union/management distinction was not necessary to allow train dispatchers to act as professionals, but some railroads management thought it so.

Over the years I found that dispatchers from the era of being expected to run the railroad frightened their insecure less knowledgeable bosses. Now, management ensures through the quality of training that such people will no longer be frightening them. The industry is so much the worse for it.

TAW

 



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 01/20/16 10:21 by TAW.

I have read that railroad managers without a solid grounding, i.e. experience, in the operation are suspicious of others
that do have that experience. One particularly bothersome area for them is in the language or lingo of operations.
Terms such as 'big hole', 'cut in the air', 'run around', 'dropping cars', 'bleeding off" etc. seem to lead
the uninformed to conclude there is a secret code or plot afoot to hide something from them. This belief leads to insecurity 
and the feeding of the "Its them vs. us" mentality. This is unfortunate because it's avoidable.

On a somewhat related theme I recall having the thought that it would really be nice if my bosses and I were really pulling in the same direction.
The first line supervisors were not so much a problem as were those in the next tier above them. These were the problem boys. The ones
who had bought in to the idea that their further advancement depended wholly in their ability to show their bosses that they
merited attention by making budget savings, i.e. overtime or arbitrary payment reductions. In the area of local freight or
road switcher assignments little, if any, attention was paid the fact that the crew(s) were serving the shipper with reliable, consistent
service. Who cares? The rise of containerization and unit trains has made this observation largely irrelevant. No boxcars, no problems.

When the BN/ATSF merger happened it was apparent here on the Pacific Division that our new masters had little time or affinity for
local or regional freight operations which was a sizable amount of our business base. Their expertise was in "The Transcon". Load those
containers aboard the stack cars, power 'em up and let em' fly. Next stop Chicago or other hub points. Never mind that those pesky local boys
out there in the PNW needed some 'hands on' intelligent attention, We've got more important things to tend to. Bigger is not always better.

Charlie




Charlie

TAW Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------

> Consider history.
>
> Originally, the superintendent did the dispatching
> personally. That wasn't practical when railroads
> developed into 24 hours a day 7 days a week
> operations. The first train dispatcher was Andrew
> Carnegie, the superintendent's clerk. He was not
> what we would now call management, but he had the
> authority of the superintendent and was expected
> (after he demonstrated what could be done and
> created the position for himself) to act as such.
> Train dispatchers became sort of like warrant
> officers of the railroad: not management but not
> labor. They were unique in their role of assuming
> responsibility, making decisions for and issuing
> instructions in the name of the superintendent.The
> profession remained as such until the desire for
> one day off a week drove NP dispatchers in Spokane
> to form a union in 1918 (I have heard it said that
> thereafter, the superintendent said that he had no
> idea that they were so serious about a day off
> every week or he would have just arranged it
> instead of the dispatchers forming a union).
>
> The union acted more like a professional
> organization than a union. Train dispatchers were
> still treated as professionals rather than labor,
> regardless of union affiliation. That's how it was
> when/where I started. Many railroads continued
> that into the 70s. Many other did not. It seems
> that by the late 70s, treating union represented
> train dispatchers like labor was almost universal.
> As an increasing number of railroads treated train
> dispatchers like labor, the union acted more like
> a union. Some railroads, Santa Fe and Union
> Pacific, for example, made a point of providing
> better conditions for the train dispatchers than
> those on union railroads. The union/management
> distinction was not necessary to allow train
> dispatchers to act as professionals, but some
> railroads management thought it so.
>
> Over the years I found that dispatchers from the
> era of being expected to run the railroad
> frightened their insecure less knowledgeable
> bosses. Now, management ensures through the
> quality of training that such people will no
> longer be frightening them. The industry is so
> much the worse for it.
>

Yes, I know the modern history, but thanks for the old Andrew Carnegie history.

I think the problem started when the railroads no longer made any money (1960s in the east, 1970s in the west). They could not hire any talent for managers becuase they could not offer much career-wise. So management quality plummeted. And then, as you say, they pushed down the qualilty of the non-exempt work force to match.

The odd thing (to me) is, now that the industry has radically changed to be profitable, the operating management jobs still offer little or no good career path, and the non-exempt jobs are still dumbed-down.

Best regards,

Rob L.

rob_l Wrote:

> I think the problem started when the railroads no
> longer made any money (1960s in the east, 1970s in
> the west). They could not hire any talent for
> managers becuase they could not offer much
> career-wise. So management quality plummeted. And
> then, as you say, they pushed down the qualilty of
> the non-exempt work force to match.

I agree. For the eastern roads that were doing better, the process took longer to initiate, hence my B&O experience.

>
> The odd thing (to me) is, now that the
> industry has radically changed to be profitable,
> the operating management jobs still offer little
> or no good career path, and the non-exempt jobs
> are still dumbed-down.

I agree here as well. It irritates me to see what you and I would consider avoidable expense and correctable conditions accepted as merely the cost of doing business because modern railroad management doesn't know any better and apparently doesn't want to.

TAW

TAW Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> I agree here as well. It irritates me to see what
> you and I would consider avoidable expense and
> correctable conditions accepted as merely the cost
> of doing business because modern railroad
> management doesn't know any better and apparently
> doesn't want to.
>
> TAW

Modern railroad management is driven by a whole different world today.

Same thing happens in most other industries.  I had some good managers and some not so good one.  I was told to do something one day and I told the supr that it wouldn't work.  He told me to do it anyway.  I told him to  put it in writing.  Sure enough, when I tried to do what he wanted, it didn't work and it effected our quality measurement systems.  Well, the excrement hit the spinny thing overhead.  I got called onto the carpet and got a bit of a chewing out.  Then I told the second level that I had written instructions to do what had failed.  He said he didn't want to see it.  I ask for union representation.  I showed the rep the written instructions.  We resumed the meeting and the union guy ask the manager why he wouldn't look at the note.  Management ended up letting me off the hook but later that week they gave me an unacceptable evaluation.  It was about the only thing they could do.  About the only thing they found acceptable was my attendance... never missed a day, never late, etc...   I had to grieve that and got it thrown out with a commitment to do a "fair" evaluation within 3 months.  

My actions would not have hurt anyone, just made our quality measurments invalid for the month.  Your actions would have cost big bucks and probably would have caused serious injuries.  Most of the time the supr's would trust my judgments.  If they didn't I would question them a second or third time but if they insisted, I did as told.  They usually got upset if something didn't go right but they would eventually learn to trust what I said.

John

I love your train order. Brace yourself! Oh man to be a fly on the wall in that room.

.

Do the crews not know their consists and territories? Or is it up to others (or modern day detectors) to protect the train?

justalurker66 Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Do the crews not know their consists and
> territories? Or is it up to others (or modern day
> detectors) to protect the train?

The crew that would handle the train through the tunnel would get on at Ellensburg. The line had been out of service for a while and the crew would have been extra. Would they have tumbled to it? Don't know and didn't care. I wanted the cars off of 97 at Pasco, not Ellensburg (where they would have been had the crew at Ellensburg figured it out). So some uh...excessive precaution put the cars exactly where I wanted them to be.

TAW



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 01/20/17 17:12 by TAW.

How has the railroad culture managed to last for 150 years without going insolvant.

I know some of them have. Its amazing.

"Well...until the night that No 12 derailed and caught fire in the Columbia River bridge at Malaga, east of Wenatchee. That's right, IN. The bridge has a through truss span, which is inside of another through truss span, GN's tricky way of increasing the bridge load limit without interrupting traffic to replace the bridge. No 12 was a stack train. The articulated cars derailed in the bridge. The scraping metal caused sparks that started a tie fire that spread to the containers and back to the ties. It was ugly. It took air strikes to put out the fire. It took days for the hot metal to cool enough to start untangling the train from the bridge. It took months to repair the damage."

Got a couple of questions for you, TAW..   Do you remember what the date was when #12 derailed??  What was the plan of action for the trains that normally ran on the GN were??   How did it affect the local business of Rock Island and Quincy??


SP8100