Eastern Railroad Discussion > CSX in 1981 Q's

Found a couple PDF's of older CSX/C&O/B&O ETT's and system maps, which really dramatizes how many lines were abandoned. I just have a few questions on some of them...

1. According to the map, the B&O Portsmouth branch was split between S. Webster and Sciotoville, while sections between there & Portsmouth, and S. Webster north were still shown in service. To my understanding, the line south of Oak Hill (past the last industry on the line) was abandoned shortly after. Was there industry in S. Webster that still needed service?

2. Was there not any online traffic between Oldtown/Dundas and Gallipolis this late in the game that caused them to keep this part of the line? Was it a contributing factor in any way to the abandonment of the Parkersburg Branch from Dundas to Belpre? I.E. was there any traffic that interchanged aT Dundas?

3. Why was the Short Line Sub from Clarksburg to New Martinsville south to Parkersburg chosen over the original PArkersburg-Clarksburg mainline? Clearance issues?

4. What were the demanding factors from PArkersburg to Cincinatti that forced CSX to abandon the mainline, versus leaving it a downgraded line or railbanking?

5. Same question as above, except for the Lexington Sub from Coalton to Winchester. Why did they choose to abandon versus simply downgrading the line or railbanking?

I can answer #2. We laid welded rail on this branch from Kanauga (junction with Conrail WV Secondary) to just outside Gallipolis; and from just north of Gallipolis (there was already welded rail through Gallipolis proper) in 1983. It supported a coal train from a mine near Minerton, just south of Dundas to the AEP power plant at Cheshire on the Ohio River. This was a Chessie (CSX) train all the way, as CSX still owns the track between Kanauga and Hobson, near Pomeroy, that NS now runs on to connect the West Virgina Sub. The track to Dundas was still in, but it was never used to my knowledge. AEP eventually built a conveyor belt that brought the coal directly from the mine to the power plant and the entire track was abandoned soon after.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 08/12/13 05:09 by zars.

]
>
> 1. According to the map, the B&O Portsmouth branch
> was split between S. Webster and Sciotoville,
> while sections between there & Portsmouth, and S.
> Webster north were still shown in service. To my
> understanding, the line south of Oak Hill (past
> the last industry on the line) was abandoned
> shortly after. Was there industry in S. Webster
> that still needed service?


The Portsmouth Sub was active to South Webster after 1981. The DT&I used the line primarily, but the B&O (Chessie) did have some business down around Firebrick...there was a brick mill in South Webster, but I am not 100% sure when it closed. After the DT&I ran their last trains, which was early 1982, the line was cut back to Firebrick. Eventually to just south of Blackfork Jct to JUST serve Nock and Son. My Grandparents lived in Oak Hill, so, I have a certain affinity to this line.


>
> 4. What were the demanding factors from
> PArkersburg to Cincinatti that forced CSX to
> abandon the mainline, versus leaving it a
> downgraded line or railbanking?

I completed an interview with a former Chessie System VP about this lines closure, here is that story:

It was the end of the fiscal year, 1985, John Snow, who was then President of the Chessie System and John Collinson, Chairman of the Board for Chessie, called all of the VP's together to discuss where the company was. Well, the numbers weren't very pretty and the operations department was in the red. Ron Drucker, the VP of Operations, quickly surmised that the Parkersburg "branch" (as it was called) would be a logical way to make up the difference. Drucker had obviously put some time into this as he then began to spew data, numbers, run times, etc...,he came prepared to make a solid argument for this line's demise. Drucker’s plan was to divert the traffic, lay off most train crews, Maintenance of Way, Signal Department and all terminal and clerical staffs. Gradually the line would die, and they could rip it out. This not only made up the operation budget deficit, but Drucker pointed immediately to the fact that they could continue to make a better profit by avoiding the operations nightmare that was the Parkersburg Sub (more on that in a bit).

In my research, my first question was, why was this line always referred to as a "branch"? By this time, summer 1985, traffic was down to four through trains or so per day via Parkersburg and Chillicothe, (two of course being pig trains), most freight traffic, even at this time, was routed via Pittsburgh and across Ohio. The concept of a “main line” seemed to be reserved for describing a route for the primary traffic line that ran up and over Sand Patch. Plus, if one traces back the history of this line, it was indeed just a branch line operation and engineered as such in it's building, it was only after the line was strung together with the Marietta and Cincinnati (B&O Ohio Division) and the Ohio and Mississippi (B&O St. Louis Division), when this line became viable as a major route.

Back to the “meeting”, at this point, when Drucker announced his plan, the new Marketing VP, Jim Hagan, nearly lost his cookies. He had been with Chessie just a little over a year and was still getting used to the culture. They (the marketing folks) were not prepared for this plan and had nothing in terms of data to defend keeping the line. Snow looked at Hagan for the facts, to which he could provide none in lieu of no data, other then the obvious fact that this move would destroy the St. Louis piggyback traffic (which it did).

It's interesting to note that Chessie System was really not that big into intermodal, period. Chessie's bread and butter was coal and manifest and in particular, auto parts. In fact some at Chessie felt TOFC was less important then general merchandise traffic. It is only after CSX evolved, and folks on the Seaboard side came into management, that started driving the intermodal needs. We also had the change in global economy that proved that TOFC/COFC was a viable option. In fact, it was auto parts traffic that was the primary reason this part of the former B&O (from Clarksburg west to Chillicothe) was given some TLC in 1963 (after the C&O merger). Clearances were raised accommodate high cubes and some auto racks but not necessarily for TOFC traffic. The tunnels were raised to 17' 2", but not the needed 20' 8" for stacks (again, TOFC was the rage until stacks became more of a rage), this also worked for high cube and most auto racks of the day. However, the tunnel enlargements were about it. Some curves were eased, but these were the real operations issue (not the grades). In fact, Chessie even had many problems with grain trains in high cube hopper cars because of harmonic issues with jointed rail, these concerns led to numerous slow orders and caveats in operations (i.e. if a train can not exceed 24 mph then speed must reduced back to 15 between MP XX to MP XX). My research shows that there were several 6 degree curves and one 7 degree curves between Clarksburg and Parkersburg. The Ohio side was a bit better except for the 8 degree curve on the Ohio University campus in Athens. But, what is an interesting twist of irony, it was during the 1963's upgrade when people saw that the traffic could be rerouted over longer routes and still have respectable transit times, perhaps the seed was planted early?

So, back to the "big table meeting", you have the realists in the operating department in the facts, and the prognosticators in marketing saying that it's our best guess that we'll get clobbered in the St. Louis market. Snow, being the accountant, went with the numbers no one seemed to cared that TOFC would get slaughtered, they wanted a clear bottom line. This was the beginning of the end. With Marketing not given a chance to defend, operations with the numbers, it was going to be a tough line to save. Indeed, the TOFC traffic did get killed as the route up and over Ohio added, at times, days to a cars schedule. It was a disaster in the making but no one appeared to be concerned.

After the line closure, the TOFC traffic, which was the pride of the line, (with names such as the St Louis Trailer Jet and the Manhattan Trailer Jet), dried up when rerouted up and over Ohio. This routes closure, to some, ended St. Louis as a viable gateway for intermodal traffic to and from the east coast ports. The irony of all of this is only after CSX spent it's money on Conrail are we seeing this begin to change. Plus, as the 1980's moved into the 90's CSX was trying to consolidate gateways to the west. At the early part of the 1990's, CSX had four gateways: Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis and New Orleans. Chicago was an obvious choice, the other was New Orleans. So again, St. Louis was allowed to fizzle out. Add to all of this the changes in global market, the slow down of domestic auto sales in the 1980's and the conditions were ripe for abandonment. Rail banking had not become as "vogue" as it is today.

So while it is perceived that the line was axed quickly, the operations numbers tell a tale that the line had declined for years (even perhaps as early as the 1960's when the original reroutes took place for the improvements). I am not letting CSX (actually Chessie System) off the hook for it's abandonment, but the numbers were not in the lines favor. There was little local traffic really any place between Chillicothe and Parkersburg (the exception of the Portsmouth Branch at Hamden, which slowly lost traffic to trucks because Chessie started retreating on service at this location), the tough operating conditions east of Parkersburg and the downturn of the economy all lead toward the result we see. It's also worth noting that the 1985 elimination of through traffic on the St. Louis main line in West Virginia was accompanied by the elimination of through traffic via Benwood Junction, south of Wheeling. Three of the four B&O routes that had once served Benwood/Wheeling were later abandoned. The Benwood Junction engine terminal, which had once been among the busiest on the B&O, was shut down when the through traffic was rerouted. During the next ten years, its structures were gradually demolished until only the coaling tower was left standing in an otherwise vacant field. It was demolished in February 1996.

Perhaps what is most troubling to people is how rapidly the line closure unfolded. The August 2nd, 1985 Jackson (Ohio) Journal Herald carried the head line: “B&O Stops Through Train Service through the Area”, the article goes on to say that local service was to continue, but all through traffic had ended the day before (Aug 1st 1985). Union representatives had been contacted the same day as one of the last through trains wheels cooled in Chillicothe yards. The Union was blindsided by all accounts. One person was told as he went to check his call status, “We stopped running trains over your line yesterday.” More then anything, it seems the railroads quick action is what’s troubling most.

In retrospect, many CSX operations people I’ve interviewed do lament about this lines removal. One operations person, who was a regional manager at the time, went so far as saying that they were hasty and that they didn’t think it through, and that it was a mistake they proceeded in the way they did. Was it a mistake? Perhaps it was...it's hard to tell. With the ongoing change in the eastern rail scene it is likely the line could have survived, at least for a while. CSX gained a far better route to St. Louis when buying Conrail, but as we know the cost was staggering.

You have to remember that in that day, "railbanking" was not really considered an option and the prospects of keeping a line indefinitely seemed to make little sense economically. Global trade was not as massive as it is today and obviously intermodal grew Same can be said for the Lexington Sub down to Winchester...it just didn't make sense at the time to keep the line. CSX merger was new and a Conrail split wasn't even being considered...

Hind site is always 20/20.

CG Tower



Edited 5 time(s). Last edit at 08/12/13 05:58 by CGTower.

Great info CG, thanks for passing this along.

Chris

I remember seeing part of that story elsewhere CG...while we're on the subject of it, IF the need arose, how hard would it be to rebuild the Parkersburg branch from it's end at Greenfield to Parkersburg, including the US Rail trackage that stands (which would obviously need all new track...) (I'd say the Lex line is SOL, most of the ROW has been taken over by roads/houses, at least between here and Hitchins/Grahn area, although the remaining track looks like it's still good for track speed.

Likely as I've pinned this story a few times in various places.

No, the Parkersburg to Cincy line will never be replaced...to expensive, nature and man have reclaimed most of the parts that were removed. CSX has more then enough route miles now to compensate for it.

CG

I'd concur, in the Athens area Ohio University & the 4 lane US 50 east of town gobbled up the right of way shortly after the rails were taken up.

They had a meeting the night of August 1st at the Chillicothe Holiday Inn to announce to the Chillicothe employees the plans to shut the line down. One of my patients was a brakeman on the last westbound TTs into Chillicothe that morning.

For whatever reason CSX still owns the right of way from Thrifton to Musselman where the Wellston Sub crossed the main. Musselman into Chillicothe is now a trail.

What really started the downfall of the Parkersburg branch, was the bridge over the Ohio river being struck by a runaway barge. The bridge was out of service for over a year. In addition there was only 2 customers between Parkersburg and Clarksburg,A customer loading untreated ties at Ellenboro and Westvaco loading pulp wood at Walker. GRS

Indeed, that was a big hit...wasn't there a fire with that incident too?

CG Tower

bridgeportsub Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> What really started the downfall of the
> Parkersburg branch, was the bridge over the Ohio
> river being struck by a runaway barge. The bridge
> was out of service for over a year. In addition
> there was only 2 customers between Parkersburg and
> Clarksburg,A customer loading untreated ties at
> Ellenboro and Westvaco loading pulp wood at
> Walker. GRS

A year sounds too long on the bridge being out of service.

Posted from Android

I'll research that one Mark, I have that info too..luster can't recall details off top of my head.

CG


mhiser Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> A year sounds too long on the bridge being out of
> service.
>
> Posted from Android