Passenger Trains > Safety officer from Dupont crash gone

Sound Transit CEO Peter Rogoff has removed his agency’s top safety officer as a result of the fatal Amtrak Cascades passenger-train derailment on Sound Transit-owned tracks in DuPont, Pierce County, in December 2017.Transit executives are also considering whether and how to impose the same rigorous training on Amtrak that Sound Transit and King County Metro demand for light-rail service, Rogoff said in an interview Wednesday.

Seattle Times story

The level of training provided by Amtrak prior to the inauguration of service on the Dead Man's Curve route was pitifully inadequate and irresponsible but overall supervision still need fall upon the owner of the railroad. If Amtrak training did not meet Sound Transit standards, Amtrak should not have been permitted to operate. One wonders what "litmus test" Amtrak's training regimen had to pass at Sound Transit, or if there was any.

I have to assume that the reference to "light rail" standards of training is a journalist's faux pas.



Edited 2 time(s). Last edit at 12/04/19 23:46 by GenePoon.

The latest round of random finger pointing by Sound Transit to try to deflect as much as possible from its own failings? Mind you, not that there is enough prima facea evidence that Amtrak did not come out with any flying colors either.

What happened to the engineer on this train?

Posted from iPhone

GenePoon Wrote:
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>
> I have to assume that the reference to "light
> rail" standards of training is a journalist's faux
> pas.

Maybe not. ST purchases service from BNSF for Sounder. They basically tell BNSF what to run when and let it go.ST probably has no standards of its own.

However, ST provides its own light rail crews.

TAW

JohnM Wrote:
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> What happened to the engineer on this train?
>
> Posted from iPhone

As far as people know, no charges were brought up against him, other than being terminated by Amtrak but I believe the union may be fighting it. He's in regular contact with people.

Has the guy who was fired been hired by another transit agency on the other side of the country yet?  These guys always keep a resume current and they're generally hired by someone else before the ink has dried on their pink slip.   

They never truly disappear or leave the industry.   

It's just like playing that game called "Whack-a-Mole" at the county fair.  You pound 'em down into the hole here and they pop up over there.   

The funniest one was that Chief Safety Officer whom Boardman hired. He showed up for work on Monday and quit, same day. Went back to his former job.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 12/06/19 15:47 by GenePoon.

Jishnu Wrote:
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> The latest round of random finger pointing by
> Sound Transit to try to deflect as much as
> possible from its own failings? Mind you, not that
> there is enough prima facea evidence that Amtrak
> did not come out with any flying colors either.

Latest round of finger pointing by people who thought putting a 30 mph curve in 80 mph territory was a great idea despite 2 fatal wrecks in the 4 years prior to this line opening from very high overspeed operation on a speed limited curve and an FRA order about speed control being needed in these curves.

It seems endless excuses will be made before addressing the fundemental engineering issue.

 A relatively inexspensive piece of copper would have either alerted the engineer of a speed reduction, or would have given a penalty brake application--the Inert ATS Inductor. We installed them in numerous locations on Metrolink where substancial speed reductions were required. 

abyler Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Jishnu Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > The latest round of random finger pointing by
> > Sound Transit to try to deflect as much as
> > possible from its own failings? Mind you, not
> that
> > there is enough prima facea evidence that
> Amtrak
> > did not come out with any flying colors either.
>
> Latest round of finger pointing by people who
> thought putting a 30 mph curve in 80 mph territory
> was a great idea despite 2 fatal wrecks in the 4
> years prior to this line opening from very high
> overspeed operation on a speed limited curve and
> an FRA order about speed control being needed in
> these curves.
>
> It seems endless excuses will be made before
> addressing the fundemental engineering issue.

abyler Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Latest round of finger pointing by people who
> thought putting a 30 mph curve in 80 mph territory
> was a great idea despite 2 fatal wrecks in the 4
> years prior to this line opening from very high
> overspeed operation on a speed limited curve and
> an FRA order about speed control being needed in
> these curves.

FRA didn't order anything for these specific curves.

> It seems endless excuses will be made before
> addressing the fundemental engineering issue.

Doesn't one slow down similarly for a turnout or crossover movement?  Like maybe a #15? 

MP555 Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> abyler Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > Latest round of finger pointing by people who
> > thought putting a 30 mph curve in 80 mph
> territory
> > was a great idea despite 2 fatal wrecks in the
> 4
> > years prior to this line opening from very high
> > overspeed operation on a speed limited curve
> and
> > an FRA order about speed control being needed
> in
> > these curves.
>
> FRA didn't order anything for these specific
> curves.

The FRA issued an order for speed control and extra precautions in all curves with a speed reduction of 25 mph or more and applied it to everyone.

First for Metro North, then the NEC, then for everywhere:

Emergency Order 29
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2013-12-11/pdf/2013-29574.pdf

Emergency Order 31
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-05-28/pdf/2015-12774.pdf

Safety Advisory 2013-08
https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Document/3508

Safety Advisory 2015-03
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/06/12/2015-14394/operational-and-signal-modifications-for-compliance-with-maximum-authorized-passenger-train-speeds

Proactive railroads like LIRR started taking action in 2014 to implement civil speed control on dangerous curves after the order was given to Metro North to prevent accidents and protect themselves legally from further liability even before the 2015 orders. Others took a more cavilier view and the result was more forseeable and preventable accidents.  I've already listened to all these arguments. If the signal system can prevent overspeed accidents, why would you NOT use it to create a safe operating environment and prevent Murphy's Law from gaining power?  This was discussed here too, it was reccomended that ATS be used on this line to protect from overspeed and that reccomendation was discounted with the results seen in the subsequent wreck.

> > It seems endless excuses will be made before
> > addressing the fundemental engineering issue.
>
> Doesn't one slow down similarly for a turnout or
> crossover movement?  Like maybe a #15? 

Absolutely. A 30 mph siding on an 80 mph mainline is a bad idea if speed is not controlled by the signal system or cab signals.  That's why we have speed signals.  BNSF's route signalling rules has speed signal indications under Rules 9.1.4 (Approach Limited 60 mph), 9.1.5 (Advance Approach 50 mph), 9.1.6 (Approach Medium 40 mph), 9.1.11 (Diverging Approach Medium 35 mph) that could also have been used here.  Would have been elementary to use an Approach Medium signal here with a special definition for the line: "Proceed prepared to pass next signal not exceeding 40 MPH and be prepared to enter restricted curve at prescribed speed."  Or just add that as a universal rule and use it all such curves.  Kansas City Southern uses this defintion for Rule 9.1.4 Medium Approach "Proceed reducing speed to 35 MPH before passing next signal."  That would have worked also.

Signals exist to provide information to the engineer, there's really no good excuse not to use them.

"Good luck out there, I hope you remember we left you a disastrous booby trap if you don't" really isn't an accpetable way of arranging and running a railroad.

 Page 51 lines 18-21 

"I realized that, when I saw the 30-mile-an-hour speed sign at the beginning of the curve, that I was not where I thought I was . . ."

https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61332/616779.pdf

It appears the engineer knew the curve was out there, SOMEWHERE, but he didn't know EXACTLY where.  When you're toddling along at 70+miles per hour, that can be a problem.   



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 12/08/19 15:14 by CA_Sou_MA_Agent.

abyler Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------

> "Good luck out there, I hope you remember we left
> you a disastrous booby trap if you don't" really
> isn't an accpetable way of arranging and running a
> railroad.

I have to disagree with that assessment.

There are something like 140 curves between Vancouver BC and Portland. The average tangent is something like three miles long. Of the curves, over 100 of them have a speed restriction. There are and have been since the line was constructed, over a dozen speed limit changes of or in excess of 25 mph. This is not a new phenomenon for anyone running the line.. This engineer has been running the line for ten years, yet the transcript has him stating at Orillia that he was not sure where he was and that were he not on Main 1 south of Kelso, he wasn't sure. There are 50 mph and 35 mph siding switches and crossovers in 79 mph territory. They get the same kind of warning as a speed zone, except it is a signal instead of a sign. On a given trip, the speed over any of them may be 79 mph or 30-50 mph. The engineer finds out about two miles from the restriction. The engineer also finds out about temporary speed restrictions and tracks out of service for maintenance two miles in advance plus in writing in the paperwork for the trip. The engineer gets a warning two miles from a speed zone too, but the speed zone is the same every trip. I'm not aware of any other overspeed incident, unless you want to refer to SLA running a red at 40 mph at Longview Jct in 1993 an overspeed incident. There has always been a reliance on engineers looking out the window. In fact, I have never worked territory on which there was not such a reliance. I also spent decades depending upon crews to read the instructions I sent them on paper (train orders restricting their speed or authority. I depended on them knowing how long things took and to comply with the schedules we provided [has right over and wait at...]).

Yeah, technological systems are nice if you have them. Better track configuration would be nice if you had the money for it. There is a little history behind this, much of which I am able to tell now.

The Point Defiance Bypass was a concept that originated in 1992 with WSDOT's consultants at the time (yes, some real railroad guys). I was working for BN on the same project. I ultimately wound up developing the concept into a more defined concept that could work. The working group consisted of BN, Amtrak, and WSDOT people working as a single team. In 1997 when BN moved everybody to Fort Worth and I didn't go, nothing changed for me except who was issuing my paychecks.

The Point Defiance Bypass was a 412 Megabuck project that included double track between TR Jct (the BN connection in Tacoma) and what became Rill, south of Lakewood, and single track to Nisqually as the final timetable did not require two tracks in that segment. The speed limit was 35 mph between TR Jct and the top of the Tacoma Gulch grade at M Street, 79 mph to Rill, and 100 mph to south of Nisqually. We asked FRA about using some existing technology speed control to allow the 100 mph speed limit and they said no, we don't know what it will be but it won't be any existing technology. That was in about 1995. Thus, we included in the program budget 308 Megabucks for an unspecified advanced signal system between Seattle and Portland and 69 Megabucks between Blaine and Seattle. That was the best we could do in 1995 and every revision through 2007.

The legislature provided funding for all aspects of the program, planning and implementation. Washington State wanted to be ready when the promised federal funding happened (a promise made in 1991). The Point Defiance Bypass would be one of the next two projects undertaken. Then came Tim Eyeman's tax revolt Initiative 695. That decimated the funding for the program. The legislature still wanted to keep it going any way they could. I was asked if it would be possible to move the existing (2000ish) traffic onto the Point Defiance Bypass for 75 Megabucks. That's what they could scrape up. I worked up what eventually became the ARRA grant project, although that was for way more trains than I planned for. Before the legislature could act, China started buying up the world's supply of concrete and steel and the cost estimate doubled. The legislature could no longer do it. That plan was set aside into a new "Mid Range Plan" that was supposed to be "More Realistic" than the Long Range Plan, given the lack of federal funding. The Point Defiance Bypass configuration in that plan was what I developed for the legislature's 75 Megabuck request years earlier. It is the version of the plan that was submitted for the federal ARRA grant in 2008. I was not uncomfortable with the configuration at all, as I described in the second paragraph. At the time, I only had about 30 years of railroad experience.

The original program development team and their effort was pretty much discontinued in about 2008. However, I did some work on the engineering of the line. I worked on tricky crossing starts and traffic light preemption, the placement of speed limit and advance signs, and signals. There is a southward block signal in the 30 mph curve. It is located not at the beginning of the curve, but far enough into the curve that a train on the approaching tangent sees that signal directly in the center of the track. That was done intentionally as an additional clue of the curve location. It is a simple matter of the track being to the left of every signal you see and this signal is in the center of the track you are on, the track must be to the left of it.

In 2015, WSDOT hired me to develop the operating plan for the new service that would commence with the opening of the bypass. I had to pack in about three times the traffic I designed for 15 years earlier and make it possible for all of them to run on time. During the course of that work, I studied all the engineering plans, made several windshield surveys, and made a hyrail trip of the entire line. Among the things I was looking for was the correct display and visibility of speed and warning signs (way outside of what was required by my assignment). I found a few problems to correct, but the signs for that curve were not among the corrections.

As opening came close, I suggested to WSDOT that I work outside of my scope to develop an engineer training guide. There was nobody who could train engineers because there was never an engineer who ran that line at over 10 mph. WSDOT agreed. I developed an engineer training track chart that included crossings and bridges by name in different colors for each type of landmark. The grades, curves, speed limits, and signals were shown. In the transcript, the engineer was asked if he had seen it. He said that he had it in his possession but never looked at it.

Short of waiting for  the implementation of a signal system that was not yet required because it couldn't be made to work because a system that hadn't been invented was specified, everything that was possible (other than the actual training that Amtrak provided the engineers, beyond what WSDOT could do) was done. In railroading that is acceptable to me, everyone in the cab is responsible for the safe operation of the train. That was not what the conductor riding the cab said his responsibility included. On a couple of occasions while learning new territory, I caught things the engineer missed just by looking out the window...on railroad I had never seen before. That's the way it was supposed to work, at least within what was considered acceptable practice.

Meanwhile, WSDOT paid for program development while other states waited for federal help so that Washington would be ready to go whenever the promised federal funding occurred. When it did, it was less than 10% of the cost of the program, so the projects were abbreviated. FRA managed the grants. FRA approved the plans. If I remember correctly, the plans were endorsed with a statement that they could not be changed without FRA approval. Nobody involved involved inn the program had a cavalier attitude about any element of it, right down to aligning a block signal in the curve with the center of the approaching tangent.

I won't speak to Amtrak's training procedure as I was not involved in that with the exception of providing training material (at WSDOT's expense and added to my budget because they agreed that it was a good thing to do) that the engineer in question had and didn't use.

NTSB rightfully criticized Sound Transit for the treatment of the speed zone for the curve in the Timetable. That was the responsibility of Sound Transit. It's their railroad. That resulted in the safety officer being dismissed, the subject of this thread. WSDOT has stated that they did not assess any disciplinary action to WSDOT employees. That is as it should be. WSDOT took every precaution that could be seen as reasonable, right down to expecting everyone in their employ to do it right, even if it went beyond the minimum effort required. WSDOT is a purchaser of service from three railroads, BNSF, Amtrak, and Sound Transit. Making them responsible for the shortcomings of the service providers would be like making passengers who paid to ride a transit bus responsible for a collision in which the bus was involved.

TAW





 

CA_Sou_MA_Agent Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------

> It appears the engineer knew the curve was out
> there, SOMEWHERE, but he didn't know EXACTLY
> where.  When you're toddling along at 70+miles
> per hour, that can be a problem.   

...the root of which is missing a reflectorized standard advance warning sign like the close 100 he encountered every trip, missing the yard tracks near that sign, as shown in the training track chart he said he didn't look at, missing the three freeway interchange overhead bridges, lit up like daytime, as shown in the training track chart he said he didn't look at, missing the absolute signal just beyond the bridges, in the training track chart he said he didn't look at, missing the overhead bridge just before the curve, that was in the training track chart that he said he didn't look at, and...MISSING THE BLOCK SIGNAL THAT WAS PLACED IN THE CURVE SO THAT IT APPEARED TO BE IN TE CENTER OF THE TRACK as the train approached it...that was visible for about 3000 feet. Worse than that, there were two of them in the cab that didn't notice any of it.

In learning the thousands of miles of railroad I've been qualified on, the first step was study the track chart. Then go out and look. Then compare what I saw and remembered with the track chart. Then do it again if the opportunity availed itself. Go out and look consisted of looking out the window. Reference to the track charts comes before and after.

TAW

TAW Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> abyler Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> > "Good luck out there, I hope you remember we
> left
> > you a disastrous booby trap if you don't"
> really
> > isn't an accpetable way of arranging and running
> a
> > railroad.
>
> I have to disagree with that assessment.

With what you write below, it seems like you agree, since the program was supposed to include speed control and you made whatever efforts you could to flag the curve.

> over a dozen speed limit changes of or in excess
> of 25 mph. This is not a new phenomenon for anyone
> running the line.. This engineer has been running

Its not a new thing, but deadly overspeed in curve wrecks seem to be becoming more common, and they don't need to be.

> except it is a signal instead of a sign. On a

And that's my point, we should use speed indications in the signal system to help protect the operation. On 80 mph lines, using Medium Approach to bring the train down to 40 mph seems like a good idea.

> every trip. I'm not aware of any other overspeed
> incident, unless you want to refer to SLA running
> a red at 40 mph at Longview Jct in 1993 an
> overspeed incident. There has always been a

Spuyten Duyvil, Frankford Jct., then Dupont.  And there were the earlier 1990ish ones on the NEC that caused the initial use of the ATC/CSS system to protect Frankford Jct., Elizabeth S-Cure and Back Bay.

> south of Nisqually. We asked FRA about using some
> existing technology speed control to allow the 100
> mph speed limit and they said no, we don't know

This to me is inexplicable. There is no reason a Medium Approach signal enforced by ATS couldn't/shouldn't have been used, and it seems like overreach to require non-existant systems instead.  If ATS wasn't good enough, CSS/ASC would work just fine as well, just like it does on the Chicago-Aurora Main Line..  I think you already told me they inexplicably rejected this.

> line. I worked on tricky crossing starts and
> traffic light preemption, the placement of speed
> limit and advance signs, and signals. There is a
> southward block signal in the 30 mph curve. It is
> located not at the beginning of the curve, but far
> enough into the curve that a train on the
> approaching tangent sees that signal directly in
> the center of the track. That was done

My thought is just drop a signal with a best aspect of Medium Approach ahead of the curve. The PRR did this at several locations many eons ago, such as westward into Zoo.  A Clear aspect could not be displayed by the block signal system because the best possible route was 30 mph, so the best possible signal only permitted that speed.

> NTSB rightfully criticized Sound Transit for the
> treatment of the speed zone for the curve in the
> Timetable. That was the responsibility of Sound
> Transit. It's their railroad. That resulted in the
> safety officer being dismissed, the subject of
> this thread. WSDOT has stated that they did not
> assess any disciplinary action to WSDOT employees.

My cavalier comment referred to two deadly wrecks in the US during the lifetime of the project and two similar deadly wrecks overseas in France and Spain taking place at "holes" in the signal systems, and yet her we go again with this project and the very first train has an identical type of overspeed wreck because no advanced action was taken to control speed beyond posting speed restriction sign boards.  I don't know what discussions went on in your area, but we had been discussing this issue out east for nearly a decade since the PTC mandate in 2008, with the obvious reccomendation of using our Automatic Speed Control/Cab Signal System to do the grunt work being made right at the beginning by some of our better signal engineers.

Were these 30 mph curves re-designed, or ROW altered in any way, when Interstate 5 was put through (within the site of this accident)? 

jp1822 Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Were these 30 mph curves re-designed, or ROW
> altered in any way, when Interstate 5 was put
> through (within the site of this accident)? 

I think Tom has explained before that one half of I-5 is the original US highway (I think US 99) and one of the bridges is the original bridge over US 99 (well, the bridge structure has been replaced, but its in the original location).  The only alteration was adding a second bridge on the north with the new southbound lanes.

So the short answer is - No.......

Thanks!

abyler Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> jp1822 Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > Were these 30 mph curves re-designed, or ROW
> > altered in any way, when Interstate 5 was put
> > through (within the site of this accident)? 
>
> I think Tom has explained before that one half of
> I-5 is the original US highway (I think US 99) and
> one of the bridges is the original bridge over US
> 99 (well, the bridge structure has been replaced,
> but its in the original location).  The only
> alteration was adding a second bridge on the north
> with the new southbound lanes.