Western Railroad Discussion > UP's problems in Houston -- as reported to the STB

Hi,

I noted in the Union Pacific's filing to the Surface Transportation Board that the railroad talked about the need to reduce the amount of switching it performs in Houston. Can anyone please explain to me what the railroad might have meant by that statement?

The railroad talked about expanding track capacity in Houston as well.

What are the problems facing the railroad in Houston? I'd like to understand more about how the railroad operates in Houston, what are the problems and their sources and what kind of solutions the railroad is actually implementing?

Not looking to beat up on UP, I just want to understand.

Also, are these problems shared by KCS and BNSF? what issues do those railroads have in Houston and along the Gulf Coast?

In advance, thanks for any assistance.

Regards,

Clif

I know they are short people there. Bunch of borrow outs from around the system in the Houston/Louisiana area

Posted from iPhone

Thanks. I noticed that the UP discussed the Houston issues in a section of its report to the STB that discusses capacity constraints.

Yep, adequate staffing is an issue, so is the lack of motive power, but what the letter lacks details about the physical plant constraints and operational issues related to that.

Any thoughts from anyone?

Regards,

Clif

The bottom line in Houston (and Chicago, St Louis, KC, etc.) is the railroads are running 2018 volumes through terminal infrastructure
that hasn't expanded since the 1920's. In fact, lots of terminal capacity was sold off as a result of the mergers over the years.
And the RR's can't practically expand existing terminal capacity because they're boxed in by development.

Our economic system rewards short-term decisions by business executives. The current generation of management has to deal with the dilemma
of making huge CapEx spends at the very late stages of the current economic expansion.

It's only now that UP has bitten the bullet to build a new yard near Hearne TX to alleviate the decades-long problems in Houston.

Robert Pierce
Sugar Land, TX
SWRails.com

Calling Bob Krebs.........

What ever the UP problems are, its sure delaying Amtrak east of Alpine Texas.

Houston.....

.... YES

.... We have a Problem!

I am a UP employee from Pocatello and just recently spent 3 months borrowed out in San Antonio. I frequently made trips to both Hearne and to Houston and yes, Houston is pretty hopeless right now. It frequently took 6 hours or more to even depart Englewood due to power issues, traffic congestion and general incompetence. On one of my return trips from Houston, Englewood built our train over tonnage to climb the hill at Kingsburry and it took another 8 hours to tell us to just get in the van and deadhead back to San Antonio, due to our train still not being built correctly. Coming into the Terminal is an entirely different issue with many different routings and seemingly no communication between the various terminal dispatchers as to which direction you are going to take and what the yarding plan will be when you arrive at either Englewood or Settagast. The plan every day is to hit your 12 hours.........and then wait hopelessly for another 2 hours or so for a van to pick you up off of your train.....wherever that may be. It gets exhausting. Honestly, I think that a previous response hit the nail on the head. We are running trains in 2018 on infrastructure that hasn't been updated in 100 years. In fact, not only has infrastructure not been improved upon, it has been removed through various mergers, consolidating the same amount of freight on fewer subdivisions and yards. One example is the former Katy (MKT) which used to run from Houston westbound through Smithville and south through Lockhart, New Braunfels and in to San Antonio. Now, the line goes no further east than Katy, so all westbound traffic must be routed onto the Glidden Sub (former SP) to San Antonio. After Flatonia there are always lots of BNSF trains running on trackage rights to Caldwell that always seem to get priority over UP. Some days there were more BNSF trains running eastbound out of San Antonio than UP trains. Every trip you could expect to NOT make it within your 12 hours. What else can you expect when you run a single track, antiquated railroad.

As for the Manpower issue, the struggle is real in Houston and San Antonio and honestly, I have no idea how they manage to keep any conductors around working for them down there. Compared with other terminals around the system the pay sucks......for starters. Crews down there spend far more time on trains and get far less time at home than we do in Pocatello and we make higher trip rates on top of that. It can take hours to navigate the terminal from Sugar City to Englewood or Settagast. Slow track, signals everywhere, every chance in the world to get yourself fired for running a red block and the pay is actually less than we make back home on an over the road trip that involves no terminal delays. Trip rates are a funny thing that any other railroader would understand, but can be difficult to explain to a non railroader. Years back the railroads went to a trip rate when calculating our pay. This eliminated all of the arbitrary claims for initial and final terminal delay, saying that it was "already included" into the trip rate. This simplified the timekeeping and actually could be seen as a pretty sweet deal for those railroaders working on long, 250+ mile runs. For those railroaders on trips to major terminals such as Houston, however, the rate of hourly pay actually went down as many hours spent within the terminal, even over 12 hours remained uncompensated on top of the trip rate. Pure and simple, the job just doesn't pay the same when broken down hourly as it does for those of us working high mileage, mainline runs out west. When compounded by the fact that the boards are always shot, you spend more time at the away terminal than at the home terminal and the management seems to always be looking for a way to fire you.......it just doesn't seem like a worthwhile career for a brand new employee, so the turnover rate is high. Many of the ones that do want to stay are fired for petty rules infractions while on their probationary period.........this is a systemwide epidemic and the railroads are going to run into the same problem as the trucking industry with manpower shortages if they don't get their act together and treat their employees like valued assets.

As for eliminating switching in Houston, this is sorely needed. It takes hours to get trains into and out of the terminal with 20 mph max speed for many miles on the Houston, Harrisburg, West Belt, East Belt and Strang subdivisions. All the yards are at capacity and there is no room for expansion. So, UP is building the new Brazos yard near Hearne. I'm sure that plenty of switching will still be conducted at Englewood and Settagast in Houston, but at a more reasonable level that allows for more fluidity. Instead of running a train to Englewood to be switched to 15 different departing trains, Hearne could build many of the originating trains to other outlying points while the Houston yards switch mostly local traffic and a few originating trains.

I would guess do a search for MDO and Houston and what applied back then would be similar today. Also an article in last months Trains about Houston.
Houston has a history of being ground zero for service problems and UP hasn't figured a way to fix it yet.

Posted from iPhone

Didn't Houston enjoy several terminal switching lines in the bad old days?

Posted from Android

Numerous corporations need to get their collective s**t together concerning the huge turnover in employees, silly fantasy pay schemes and their absolutely insane desire to fire employees before they get much of a start. Railroads and a few others seem to have a great desire to hire those who know nothing or at least are smart enough to make the RR think they know nothing, its about the only way to get on. In a UP hiring session they asked all of us what our main job would be ( t & e ) and one kid said to shovel the coal faster to make the train go faster. I'm sure that guy is an executive already!!



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 04/07/18 05:50 by dcfbalcoS1.

Houston ripped out Cheney yard, Hardy Street Yard, neutered Eureka, cut the Katy, and blasted the Bellaire. No wonder the place is in perpetual meltdown....

"the railroads...treat their employees like valued assets."

I don't see that happening in my lifetime.

I was one of the 80 SP Officers from other divisions used to help out in Houston when the SP made a mess of East Texas in 1980. The SP moved HUNDREDS more cars per day through Englewood (Houston) then than the UP does now! But we could kick cars, drop cars, and get on and off of moving equipment!

The SP's superintendent at the time didn't hire enough train service employees because he didn't want to pay guarantee over the winter, so he was way short in the spring when business picked up. When Englewood became congested and trains couldn't get in and out, they lost track of where crews were, resulting in lots of dead trains in sidings with crews dead over twelve hours. Needless to say, these crews were still being paid overtime, and weren't getting rested to become available again. There were letters from the superintendent posted in the locker rooms promising that "...there would be no more crews waiting for relief on dead trains for 16 hours!"

Now, most of the UP's managers don't have operating experience, and aren't familiar with the territory, so they can't help a borrowed out crew spot cars on a branch line they aren't familiar with. Not being familiar with the territory, they don't know how to drive to a particular refinery to pick up a dead crew.



The infrastructure is still there, but instead of a conductor who had to have 160 main line trips before being allowed to take the conductors test, and two brakemen, you have a conductor who took the test when he or she was hired, and a new hire brakeman. They can't kick cars or get on or off moving equipment, and the UP can't figure out why the work doesn't get done?

The SP didn't build Strang because they wanted to, they built it because they HAD to. Englewood couldn't handle all the traffic, so Strang was built to classify the outbound refinery loads into blocks that could bypass Englewood and be picked up by through trains after they had left Englewood. Strang also allowed inbound cars to come in from anywhere without being blocked, they classified the cars into the trains for the locals to spot.

The UP has enough power, they just don't know how to use it. Last Sunday I passed a manifest train Westbound between Bakersfield and Fresno with about 55 cars, 4 big units on the head end, and a two unit DP. First off, it didn't need the DP to get up Cajon, or the DP and the rear two head end units West of Bena. Its flat between Bena and Red Bank, about 400 miles North, where the SP had Southbound lumber trains set out units to be picked up by Eastbound trains that needed them. The same Westbound that set out a unit at Red Bank ran 400 miles on the flat to Bena where it picked up a unit or two to get over Tehachapi.
G

Although the specific solutions were different when comparing the 1979/80 SP meltdown with the 1997 UP meltdown in the Houston area the solution is always based on solving the formula of processing demand not exceeding the resources (people) and tools (physical capacity). In both of those cases almost all of the solutions could be found by carefully listening to the people whose lives were made miserable by the dysfunctional yardmasters, TY&E, dispatchers and experienced front line supervisors.

In the case of the SP meltdown there were too many classification moves which were unnecessary and were bogging Englewood down. When those were identified and redesigned the trains started to move fluidly and all of the extra help could return home because once again trains could be expected to easily make it across the crew districts within the hours of service. Before those structural operating changes were made management kept treating the symptoms by building more receiving tracks, hiring more people and leasing more locomotives. Those actions helped the days be less painful but did not make for a consistent railroad operation.

I assisted in resolving the 1997 problems although I was with BNSF at the time. From a high level the central cause was changing to a new operation which introduced unaccustomed functions to the major terminals before enough integration had occurred between the former SP operation and that of UP. The solution ultimately was to discontinue trying to drive square pegs into round holes until more infrastructure was built.

The thing both of these meltdowns had in common was that they were originally caused by operating management's lack of specific understanding of the capabilities of the physical plant and understanding of the impacts of controllable volume segments on the very ability of even the best railroaders to operate the place. Both metastasized and quickly spread over parts of the railroad that were not even close to ground zero. Both cost railroads revenue and credibility. Unfortunately most of the people who learned the lessons of 1980 were not around by 1997.

20 years later we have another situation that is now affecting more than just the Houston/Gulf Coast area. Central Texas and the Gulf Coast will be more easily managed once the new yard in the Brazos River Valley is constructed but this situation must be resolved long before the new classification yard goes in service. If and when the railroad starts operating fluidly it will be because leadership rolls up its collective sleeves and gets down and dirty into the details with the folks who are trying to make the railroad run, then takes the input and puts together an operation which is well understood by the whole organization and consistently works.

rdb

ExSPCondr Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Last Sunday I passed a manifest train
> Westbound between Bakersfield and Fresno with
> about 55 cars, 4 big units on the head end, and a
> two unit DP. First off, it didn't need the DP to
> get up Cajon, or the DP and the rear two head end
> units West of Bena. Its flat between Bena and Red
> Bank, about 400 miles North, where the SP had
> Southbound lumber trains set out units to be
> picked up by Eastbound trains that needed them.
> The same Westbound that set out a unit at Red Bank
> ran 400 miles on the flat to Bena where it picked
> up a unit or two to get over Tehachapi.
> G

Thanks for the great insight on the SP and your time working Houston. I agree with almost everything. I just have to correct you on your suggestion that the DPU's were not needed......most likely they were needed and the UP was simply transporting an extra, dead unit that was due for maintenance. All four head end units were not online as it would be against the rules. If they were big AC units, they were rated at 12.1 EPA each. 4 units would equal 48.4 EPA, but manifest trains are only allowed to have a maximum of 36 EPA on the head end when travelling up a grade exceeding 1.9%. This is to help avoid stringline derailments which are so common on Tehachapi. To add more weight, cut in or read DPUs or helpers must be added to support some of the weight on the rear. Were the cars loaded or empty? If they were all loads I would assume the train weight was around 6000 tons, which would mean 3 units would not be able to pull it. Most likely they were running the train with 2 units running on the head end and 2 units running on the rear end with an dead unit thrown into the mix.

ExSPCondr Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> The SP's superintendent at the time didn't hire enough train service employees because he didn't
> want to pay guarantee over the winter, so he was way short in the spring when business picked up.

This continued short sightedness still hinders operations today. That pesky operating radio keeps getting in the way of things.

> The UP has enough power, they just don't know how to use it. Last Sunday I passed a manifest train
> Westbound between Bakersfield and Fresno with about 55 cars, 4 big units on the head end, and a
> two unit DP. First off, it didn't need the DP to get up Cajon, or the DP and the rear two head end
> units West of Bena. Its flat between Bena and Red Bank, about 400 miles North, where the SP had
> Southbound lumber trains set out units to be picked up by Eastbound trains that needed them.
> The same Westbound that set out a unit at Red Bank ran 400 miles on the flat to Bena where it picked
> up a unit or two to get over Tehachapi.

The UP for some reason does not want to staff Bakersfield so it could be the point where they add or cut off DPUs on trains, so they end up dragging the units around needlessly between Roseville (or Lathrop, or Benicia) and Bakersfield. I will add that the UP has better marketed things on northbound traffic here and is moving more loads north than the SP ever was, with some of these West Colton to Roseville manifests running in the 9000 ton range, but that still doesn't require any helpers north of Bakersfield.

RollinB Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Unfortunately most of the people who learned the lessons of 1980 were not around by 1997.

And those who learned the hard way in 1997 are mostly gone now. For some reason we keep forgetting the mistakes of the past and seem destined to relearn them the hard way.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 04/07/18 13:18 by ble692.

"If and when the railroad starts operating fluidly it will be because leadership rolls up its collective sleeves and gets down and dirty into the details with the folks who are trying to make the railroad run, then takes the input and puts together an operation which is well understood by the whole organization and consistently works."

That's a big "If." During a severe weather situation when things were not looking so good, my conductor tried to make a suggestion which would have helped the operation of a number of trains. The Division Superintendent told him, "You don't get paid to think." So, we followed the plan of the one with the higher pay grade, and, as expected, things didn't go very well. Operating management today, it being the almost thankless job that it has become, is often not occupied anymore by people that have worked their way up the ranks, and it shows. Don't bother taking the input of a crew who has sixty years experience between them. "We have a better plan."

irhoghead Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> "If and when the railroad starts operating fluidly
> it will be because leadership rolls up its
> collective sleeves and gets down and dirty into
> the details with the folks who are trying to make
> the railroad run, then takes the input and puts
> together an operation which is well understood by
> the whole organization and consistently works."
>
> That's a big "If." During a severe weather
> situation when things were not looking so good, my
> conductor tried to make a suggestion which would
> have helped the operation of a number of trains.
> The Division Superintendent told him, "You don't
> get paid to think." So, we followed the plan of
> the one with the higher pay grade, and, as
> expected, things didn't go very well. Operating
> management today, it being the almost thankless
> job that it has become, is often not occupied
> anymore by people that have worked their way up
> the ranks, and it shows. Don't bother taking the
> input of a crew who has sixty years experience
> between them. "We have a better plan."

And believe it or not, it's the same way in the LTL trucking business. The route drivers, with all their knowledge of the local customer base, are told to "be quiet" when it comes to operating decision input.

RollinB Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
>
> In the case of the SP meltdown there were too many
> classification moves which were unnecessary and
> were bogging Englewood down. When those were
> identified and redesigned the trains started to
> move fluidly and all of the extra help could
> return home because once again trains could be
> expected to easily make it across the crew
> districts within the hours of service. Before
> those structural operating changes were made
> management kept treating the symptoms by building
> more receiving tracks, hiring more people and
> leasing more locomotives. Those actions helped
> the days be less painful but did not make for a
> consistent railroad operation.
>
> snip
>
> The thing both of these meltdowns had in common
> was that they were originally caused by operating
> management's lack of specific understanding of the
> capabilities of the physical plant and
> understanding of the impacts of controllable
> volume segments on the very ability of even the
> best railroaders to operate the place. Both
> metastasized and quickly spread over parts of the
> railroad that were not even close to ground zero.
> Both cost railroads revenue and credibility.
> Unfortunately most of the people who learned the
> lessons of 1980 were not around by 1997.
>


We are dealing with this exact thing in Roseville. Blocking trains not just for destinations, but for specific locations at those destinations. Presumably all to save a switch crew at an outlying yard. The bowl is in constant chaos, requiring significant extra work on the trim side of the yard. Those delays pile up quickly.

The fluidity of the entire terminal revolves around bowl integrity, but that is the last thing considered as the meltdown begins.