Western Railroad Discussion > Two short reports from FRA on RCL [links]

These two short reports may or may not be interesting, depending upon your point of view.

(.pdf reader required)

http://www.ble-t.org/pr/pdf/rr0503.pdf

http://www.ble-t.org/pr/pdf/rr0505.pdf

If you're having trouble getting the linked pages to open, keep trying. I had trouble, too.

At any rate, here's the page on the BLET web site that summarizes them:

http://www.ble.org/pr/news/pf_newsflash.asp?id=4123

FRA research on remote control confirms significant safety concerns

CLEVELAND, June 3 -- The Federal Railroad Administration's Office of Research and Development issued two reports on May 24, confirming significant safety concerns with remote control locomotives.

In general, the FRA-sponsored research documents many of the concerns expressed by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen regarding the hazards of remote control.

The FRA's report (RR05-05), titled "Human Factors Root Cause Analysis of Accidents/Incidents Involving Remote Control Locomotives" collected information on reportable remote control accidents/incidents from May to October 2004. A total of 67 remote control accidents/incidents were reported during that time, but only six were studied in detail.

The FRA's analysis determined that four critical safety issues were common in the six case studies:

<> Loss of Remote Control Operator (RCO) situation awareness;

<> Insufficient RCO training;

<> Inadequate staffing and pairing of inexperienced crew members; and

<>Inadequate practices and procedures governing remote control operations and the use of remote control technology, including the pullback protection system.

"The FRA's conclusions come as no surprise to the BLET," National President Don Hahs said. "We have argued for more than three years now that remote control operators are too inexperienced and receive too little training. We have also spoken out about the need for enforceable safety regulations to govern operation of the technology and the fact that two overwhelmed crew members cannot perform the work of three people. We have also argued that lack of proper point protection is a major factor in many accidents and the FRA's report goes along with what we've said from the beginning."

The other FRA sponsored report (RR05-03) is titled "Remote Control
Operations: Results of Focus Groups with Remote Control Operators in the U.S. and Canada." Seventy-eight RCOs participated in 12 focus group meetings conducted in four cities from March to May of 2003. The focus groups expressed several key themes that echoed the BLET on a number of issues, including:

<> Less than adequate training. RCOs felt that two weeks of training was inadequate to fully prepare them for their jobs.

<> Knowledge of Remote Control Locomotive (RCL) operations. RCOs felt that other operating employees and management have a limited understanding of RCL operations, resulting in few rules, little guidance on what to do in unusual circumstances, changing and sometimes problematic procedures, cuts of cars that are as long as the remote control zone (RCZ), poor communications between RCOs and management, and inadequate maintenance of equipment. Separately, RCOs said that they have encountered employees who work in the vicinity of, or with, RCOs who are not familiar with RCL operations and procedures.

<> "Perceived" reliability of RCL equipment. RCOs described several types of reliability problems associated with the RCL equipment, including communication failures between the Remote Control Device (RCD) and On-board Control Computer (OCC), frequent error messages, delays in RCL response, and RCL overspeed.

<> Inadvertent activation of the RCD. RCOs reported frequent problems with inadvertent activation of the RCD. Causes of inadvertent activation include the location of switches, bumping into rail equipment as a result of mounting or dismounting equipment, and use of thick gloves in cold weather.

<> RCO situation awareness. RCOs report that operating the RCL on the ground away from the locomotive has reduced some of the critical feedback cues (visual and kinesthetic) available to cab-based operators, and consequently reduces their situation awareness.

The BLET strongly objects to one of the "key themes" stated by FRA in its research report. According to the report, remote control operators noted that many adjustments would need to be made in order to operate remote control locomotives in "other-than-yard" operations. The RCOs specifically asked for the following: "more extensive training (to cover train handling, air brakes, locomotive systems and troubleshooting, communications protocols, and territory familiarization), more reliable and responsive RCL equipment (e.g., the locomotive's brakes must respond immediately to an RCD input), and more information on, and control over, the RCL and consist (e.g., information on air pressure status and access to dynamic brakes). RCOs wanted as much knowledge and control over the locomotive and consist as locomotive engineers have when operating a locomotive conventionally."


"The RCOs indicated that there are three areas of improvement necessary to engage in 'other-than-yard' operations," President Hahs said. "However, the BLET will say right now that each of those three areas infringe upon the specific duties reserved for locomotive engineers under the collective bargaining agreements. These suggested changes or 'improvements' also violate the January 10, 2003, decision of Arbitrator Gil Vernon, Chairman of Special Board of Adjustment No. 1141."

In that case, the Arbitrator ruled that remote control should only be used in and around yards.

"In essence, the FRA is suggesting that these employees be given the same safety sensitive duties as locomotive engineers," President Hahs said. "Evidently, these employees know that operating a train from the cab of the locomotive is the safest way to work. Since that is the case, the work of locomotive engineers should be left to locomotive engineers.

"In the Vernon award, which gave the remote control work to UTU members, the arbitrator used the following analogy: He said locomotive engineers were comparable to highly skilled chefs preparing a seven-course meal, while remote control operators were comparable to an untrained chef pushing a button on a microwave oven to cook a TV dinner. It now appears the FRA is suggesting that those microwave operators receive chef training."

President Hahs indicated that such "improvements," even if they were technologically possible, would not offer an equivalent level of safety as conventional cab operations and therefore, any attempt to implement them would be challenged by BLET.

The FRA reports were performed by Foster-Miller, Inc., under the direction of the FRA Office of Research and Development (Human Factors Program) and the FRA Office of Safety. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen and the United Transportation Union also lent support. Dr. Frederick Gamst provided expertise during the study as well.

Copies of the reports are available on the BLET website at:

http://www.ble-t.org/pr/pdf/rr0503.pdf

http://www.ble-t.org/pr/pdf/rr0505.pdf

Interesting - I wonder how this will actually affect the UP's local switch jobs in Orange County since they all (with the exception of the Costa Mesa Switcher) run with RCL and most operate between 5 to 10 miles from a yard.

Chris

I knew all along Remotes are unsafe; this study just supports my beliefs. Its all about cost cutting and getting rid of people on todays Class 1 railroads. It doesn't matter if its unsafe or makes sense, and customers be damned! The railroads will just shrink the the customer business base to suit their current operating & business models, we all know that.

Rail1