Canadian Railroads > MM&A - The Unions Point Of View

Well, since my last thread...why not a link to a union official and his take. Interesting.

http://bangordailynews.com/2013/08/06/news/state/lac-megantic-crash-a-failure-of-management-union-rep-says/

From all I've read about this disaster, there is plenty of blame to go around.

From what I can gather, the MM&A US railroaders are represented by the BLET Division of the Teamsters, and possibly to UTU, and the Canadian MM&A railroaders are represented by the USWA (Steelworkers or Metallos in QC).

"An engineer would have had to start setting brakes from the train’s rearmost car, or the car closest to the downhill slope, Stem said."

The rearmost car was the car FURTHEST from the downhill slope. This guy makes the union look bad.

Best regards,

Rob L.

Whats he saying; One man cant set the required number of handbrakes?
RB

Incredible the amount of people who feel justified in making statements without having the information necessary to support them.

rev66vette Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Incredible the amount of people who feel justified
> in making statements without having the
> information necessary to support them.

They all must be politicians!

. Union leaders sometimes do their membership a disservice by making statements about incidents, when they sometimes know little about day to day operations or rules themselves. The crew size is really immaterial, while I personally think two people would be best size from my own working experience,the fact remains that only person was there,and either he did not set enough brakes or something else when horribly wrong after left the train. In any case, the download of the engine tapes will tell for sure what really happened.

mopacrr Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> . Union leaders sometimes do their membership a
> disservice by making statements about incidents,
> when they sometimes know little about day to day
> operations or rules themselves. The crew size is
> really immaterial, while I personally think two
> people would be best size from my own working
> experience,the fact remains that only person was
> there,and either he did not set enough brakes or
> something else when horribly wrong after left the
> train. In any case, the download of the engine
> tapes will tell for sure what really happened.

Some information was posted that indicated time on duty was not usually a factor for the engineer on this job. What I haven't seen is any information about the railroad's rules and practices in regard to tying down trains at this point. My guess is that in spite of what the formal rules were, the train service employees were told how many handbrakes would be enough. I'm looking forward to the results of the investigation to see what can be established about the events leading up to the tragedy.

mopacrr Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> . Union leaders sometimes do their membership a
> disservice by making statements about incidents,
> when they sometimes know little about day to day
> operations or rules themselves. The crew size is
> really immaterial, while I personally think two
> people would be best size from my own working
> experience,the fact remains that only person was
> there,and either he did not set enough brakes or
> something else when horribly wrong after left the
> train. In any case, the download of the engine
> tapes will tell for sure what really happened.


My opinion - the most horribly wrong situation was parking an unattended train on a downhill loaded with hazardous material, at a location just above a population of thousands. Whomever it was that made that decision owns the principal responsibility for the wreck. Not that this excused those who followed and made bad choices - but #1 was the policy of staging that train on a hill. It was the Johnstown flood, with crude oil as the killer instead of water.

Bob

In reply to the two previous posts, I can 't disagree that tieing 10,000 ton oil train on the side of a 1% is a good idea,and the person who made that decision bears some of the blame.However, seventeen or so years ago, before DP coal trains were introduced, I was instructed to tie down a 110 car 13,000 ton coal train on the side of a 1% grade to push another train , which had laid down on a hill ahead of our train a few miles ahead. I told the dispatcher what was involved in tieing the train down and about how long it would take,but the answer was "Just do it". Well 1 1/2 hours, four securement checks, 52 handbrakes later; we had the train secured to where we cut off and push the other train. Needless to say dispatcher was not happy,and I had some explaining to do when I tied up later that day.However, the engineer and I agreed that we were not going to run off and leave a loaded coal train not properly secured on the side of a 1% grade , and we followed the rule to the letter.Needless to say, no loaded coal, grain, or manifest train has ever been instructed to tie its train down in that location since to help another train. I have no doubt had we not properly secured that coal train and it had rolled off, the results would have been the same as the oil train ;only without the fire. Sometimes you to work around poor managerial or operating decisions if only to protect your job.

mopacrr Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> (snip)

>However, the engineer and I agreed that we
> were not going to run off and leave a loaded coal
> train not properly secured on the side of a 1%
> grade , and we followed the rule to the
> letter.Needless to say, no loaded coal, grain, or
> manifest train has ever been instructed to tie its
> train down in that location since to help another
> train. I have no doubt had we not properly secured
> that coal train and it had rolled off, the results
> would have been the same as the oil train ;only
> without the fire. Sometimes you to work around
> poor managerial or operating decisions if only to
> protect your job.

And that's really at the heart of this issue. Five hundred miles away, the DS had no interest in your train. His concern was the stalled train ahead, and getting it out of the way.

mopacrr Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> In reply to the two previous posts, I can 't
> disagree that tieing 10,000 ton oil train on the
> side of a 1% is a good idea,and the person who
> made that decision bears some of the
> blame.However, seventeen or so years ago, before
> DP coal trains were introduced, I was instructed
> to tie down a 110 car 13,000 ton coal train on the
> side of a 1% grade to push another train , which
> had laid down on a hill ahead of our train a few
> miles ahead. I told the dispatcher what was
> involved in tieing the train down and about how
> long it would take,but the answer was "Just do
> it". Well 1 1/2 hours, four securement checks, 52
> handbrakes later; we had the train secured to
> where we cut off and push the other train.
> Needless to say dispatcher was not happy,and I had
> some explaining to do when I tied up later that
> day.However, the engineer and I agreed that we
> were not going to run off and leave a loaded coal
> train not properly secured on the side of a 1%
> grade , and we followed the rule to the
> letter.Needless to say, no loaded coal, grain, or
> manifest train has ever been instructed to tie its
> train down in that location since to help another
> train. I have no doubt had we not properly secured
> that coal train and it had rolled off, the results
> would have been the same as the oil train ;only
> without the fire. Sometimes you to work around
> poor managerial or operating decisions if only to
> protect your job.



Thanks for the story.

I note with interest: 52 handbrakes tied

Compare that to: report that the MM&A guy tied 11 (and whether that's 11 cars plus each locomotive or 11 total is not known) for 10,000 ton train on 1.25% grade.

How 11 was determined to be the correct number is of importance. MM&A policy that that was a sufficient number? Or 11 in concert with air was policy? Or some other determination?

BTW, I know nothing of the mechanics of these things, so flame gently please. I merely note the differences between mopacrr's anecdote and what was reportedly done that night at Nantes and wonder why.

BobE

mopacrr Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> In reply to the two previous posts, I can 't
> disagree that tieing 10,000 ton oil train on the
> side of a 1% is a good idea,and the person who
> made that decision bears some of the
> blame.However, seventeen or so years ago, before
> DP coal trains were introduced, I was instructed
> to tie down a 110 car 13,000 ton coal train on the
> side of a 1% grade to push another train , which
> had laid down on a hill ahead of our train a few
> miles ahead. I told the dispatcher what was
> involved in tieing the train down and about how
> long it would take,but the answer was "Just do
> it". Well 1 1/2 hours, four securement checks, 52
> handbrakes later; we had the train secured to
> where we cut off and push the other train.
> Needless to say dispatcher was not happy,and I had
> some explaining to do when I tied up later that
> day.However, the engineer and I agreed that we
> were not going to run off and leave a loaded coal
> train not properly secured on the side of a 1%
> grade , and we followed the rule to the
> letter.Needless to say, no loaded coal, grain, or
> manifest train has ever been instructed to tie its
> train down in that location since to help another
> train. I have no doubt had we not properly secured
> that coal train and it had rolled off, the results
> would have been the same as the oil train ;only
> without the fire. Sometimes you [have] to work around
> poor managerial or operating decisions if only to
> protect your job.

The strength of character is revealed in how people handle a moral dilemma. You put safety above everything else. There is no better lesson in railroading.

Best regards,

Rob L.