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Tom Walsh tells The Canadian Press a date for a preliminary inquiry for his client, Tom Harding, and two other men will be set Jan. 15.

http://infotel.ca/newsitem/crime-lac-megantic/cp29850078



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 09/11/14 10:46 by RayLGrinder.

Going to be a field day for the lawyers.

Good summary in the article

--no charges against Burckhart
--defense will assert "human error" not "wanton neglect"
--railroad's absence of a safety management system contributed to the crash
--Transport Canada, the regulator, showed poor oversight of the industry and little understanding of the risks in the oil trade


[Edited to reflect Transport Canada. Thanks for the correction]



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 09/12/14 02:20 by Lackawanna484.

Lackawanna484 Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> --TSB showed poor oversight of the industry and
> little understanding of the risks in the oil trade

Just a clarification - Transport Canada dropped the ball, not the TSB. Different animals.

Ray

Help me understand something here. From my experiences working for a Class One railroad, why is it when an employee gets injured for whatever reason, fails to comply 100% of the time to operating rules, safety rules, and generally any rule, the fallout (discipline) is handed out to both employee and an official. For instance, I violate a rule on my own initiative and pay the consequence. Then upper management "disciplines" the employees supervisor, even though that supervisor played no part in my violation of the rule. Now, I've heard over my lifetime that when an employee does something wrong that the blame also is given to that employees supervisor because that supervisor didn't do his job otherwise the employee wouldn't have violated a rule. I never understood that and in most cases do not believe that. So...

What does the saying "the buck stops here" really mean? I thought it meant that the guy (boss) took the fall along with the employee. If it does, then why does Burkhardt get a pass on prosecution? Of course I know Burkhardt had absolutely nothing to do with improperly securing that train, but why in some cases do they hang the employee and bosses and in other cases they do not hang the boss to?

I see what happened up there in Canada both ways when it comes to discipline and legal charges. What I don't see is why, in this instance, Burkhardt escapes prosecution.

Before you reply, remember I am only looking for the differences in the times a boss gets disciplined with the employee and sometimes he doesn't.

I'm sure I didn't state this very well. Heck, it looks confusing to me. I'm hoping someone will be able to see what I'm getting at here. Thanks.

I read TSB R13D0054 in detail, the Report on the Lac Megantic incident.

It's stated aim was to not assign blame, but to present a great body of evidence which will be used in the criminal trial and other legal proceedings. It does that.

As a retired operating employee for CP, and a person whose career somewhat paralleled that of the accused locomotive engineer, I can see many mitigating circumstances which would affect any finding of guilt regarding "willful negligence causing death".

As a former Montrealer, I realise that I know friends and work colleagues of the accused engineer who is a second generation railroader with a brother working in the running (operating) trades in Montreal. Among the railway community in Quebec, this is a very emotional issue and there is a fund being raised among railroaders for the legal defence of those accused.

Mr.Harding had made 60 trips between Farnham (his home terminal) and Megantic (his away from home terminal) in 2013. Of these 40 were made with a conductor and 20 were SPTO (Single Person Train Operation).

The crude oil trains resulted in the MM&A operations between Farnham QC and Brownville Jct. ME. becoming daily rather than the three times per week operation of general merchandise and container trains prior to the inception of the oil traffic.

This resulted in a crew shortage, which resulted in more frequent SPTO operation. If a conductor was available, one would be supplied.

Another contributing factor was deteriorating track conditions. Many long 25 mph speed restrictions, and some 10 and 15 mph restrictions had lengthened the trip times on both sides of Megantic, meaning that both the US and Canadian train crews required mandated rest periods at the end of their journeys. Both eastbound and westbound trains would often have to be left unattended near Megantic while awaiting rested crews. Because Megantic has a small rail yard, and numerous highway crossings, Nantes to the west of Megantic and Vachon to the east were frequent locations where trains awaiting crews were tied up.

Mr.Harding evidently "owned" (was the assigned engineer) position on the MMA-02 eastbound and MMA-1 westbound between Farnham and Megantic, however the characteristics of the tasks involved could change every trip. Sometimes there was switching en route, and sometimes he worked with a conductor. Sometimes the train could reach Megantic and change off with the Brownsville Jct. crew, other times not.

MM&A worked with shortline rules, meaning that he was a de facto "transport specialist" performing switching tasks with trackmobiles or RCO equipped locomotives. The operating employees were Steelworker (USWA) members. USWA has an SPTO collective agreement based on Steel Industry rail operations.

The reason I mention operating practices on MMA 1 and 2 is that it is unclear how often Mr.Harding had to perform the requirements of CROR 112 (Securing of unattended trains at remote locations). He may have frequently been involved in securing trains at Nantes, but how often was he the person tying down the handbrakes? . You would think that MM&A would have endeavoured to send out trains where it was already known they would be tying down east of the usual change off point with a conductor, and there is good evidence this was the case. However, this was the height of summer and there was no other crewmen available. The report notes that MM&A attempted to contact an off duty locomotive engineer who lives near Lac Megantic to help, but that he was not home.

By the strangest of circumstances, shortly before I retired from CP, I got to perform the requirements of Rule 112 by myself.
I was on an eastbound grain empties when the conductor who was riding in the locomotive cab with me said "I am feeling deathly ill,and need to get to hospital" I bought the train to a stop near a highway crossing, and later helped the paramedics carry the semi-conscious man to the ambulance. No relief crew was immediately available. This was two track CTC territory. For added protection, I was granted Rule 266 protection of the adjacent track (track and time). I then calculated the number of handbrakes required, tied down the front of the train and then released the automatic and independent air brakes and performed a pull test.
I also did the required every 30 minute communication with the RTC saying "I'm OK and alert and this is what I am doing'.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 09/14/14 09:51 by eminence_grise.