Passenger Trains > NTSB Ruling Yet In 2005 Metra Derailment?

I was searching for something else when I came across these threads about the September 17, 2005 derailment of Metra Train #504 in Chicago:
http://www.trainorders.com/discussion/read.php?4,1002815
http://www.trainorders.com/discussion/read.php?4,1008509
http://www.trainorders.com/discussion/read.php?4,1015354
http://www.trainorders.com/discussion/read.php?4,1204125

There were a couple of mentions of the ruling taking a couple of years, and we are at two years and almost four months, so I was curious if the NTSB has ruled yet.

A few other things:
Did the engineer/operator, Mike (Michael) Smith get back to work for Metra? If so, what was his discipline?

Much was made about whether he missed a signal, yet he replied he saw all greens. Wouldn't he have had to have missed at least TWO signals more restrictive than clear? Like maybe a flashing yellow at the previous block and then a red-over-yellow at the crossover? Personally, I would hope they would use a three-signal sequence (like flashing-yellow, double-yellow, red-over-yellow) over the course of three blocks, particularly with the low-speed crossovers, but I'm not familiar with the area, so I don't know whether this would be practical.

Did Metra make any infrastructure changes, i.e. changes to the signal system or higher-speed crossovers, in response to this incident?

Thanks for any help,
-Wes

Complete report at:
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/RAB0607.pdf

Correction--the citation I gave you is actually an accident brief, not a full and final report. Still, It's 13 pages, has a good deal of detail, track diagram, etc.

> Wouldn't he
> have had to have missed at least TWO signals more
> restrictive than clear? Like maybe a flashing
> yellow at the previous block and then a
> red-over-yellow at the crossover?

Metra's Rock Island District does not have an advanced approach/flashing yellow... rather only approach before a red signal.


> Did Metra make any infrastructure changes, i.e.
> changes to the signal system or higher-speed
> crossovers, in response to this incident?

At the time of the accident, Metra was in the process of a mainline bridge replacement project which involved moving the mainline over. The majority of this project is now complete, and the 10mph crossover is no longer there... however only 40mph crossovers were used as replacements. 40mph crossovers are most common on Metra owned trackage, 25mph crossovers are also present on Metra's 79mph Rock Island District.

metraRI Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> > Wouldn't he
> > have had to have missed at least TWO signals
> more
> > restrictive than clear? Like maybe a flashing
> > yellow at the previous block and then a
> > red-over-yellow at the crossover?
>
> Metra's Rock Island District does not have an
> advanced approach/flashing yellow... rather only
> approach before a red signal.
>
>
> > Did Metra make any infrastructure changes, i.e.
> > changes to the signal system or higher-speed
> > crossovers, in response to this incident?
>
> At the time of the accident, Metra was in the
> process of a mainline bridge replacement project
> which involved moving the mainline over. The
> majority of this project is now complete, and the
> 10mph crossover is no longer there... however only
> 40mph crossovers were used as replacements. 40mph
> crossovers are most common on Metra owned
> trackage, 25mph crossovers are also present on
> Metra's 79mph Rock Island District.

I doubt very much that an "advanced approach" "approach diverging" "diverging clear" sequence would've changed the outcome, here. Interestingly, there's no mention about the engr.'s cellphone use which was part of the investigation. To me, that's a very serious omission in the report, and one that is very conspicuous in its absence.

Thanks all for the replies (and the pointer to the NTSB brief).
Interesting about the cell phone. Should we expect a final report, or is this all they will likely publish?
IC_2024, why would you doubt that the three-signal sequence would not have changed things? I think that one additional signal with "color" (a flashing-yellow) would have had a GREAT chance of avoiding the outcome we saw from this accident. Yellow gets an engineer's attention, and two chances of seeing it here could have saved lives I believe... Granted, if he missed the double-yellow, he still should have seen the diverging clear (red-over-green), but absent seeing any yellow, the fact that it was red/green and not green/red just didn't catch his attention (though it certainly should have). I'd like to hear what more rails have to say on this -- do you believe having a flashing-yellow prior to the double-yellow would have likely saved this train, and this engineer, from the fate that befell them?
Thanks,
-Wes

IC_2024 Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
<snip>
> I doubt very much that an "advanced approach"
> "approach diverging" "diverging clear" sequence
> would've changed the outcome, here.
> Interestingly, there's no mention about the
> engr.'s cellphone use which was part of the
> investigation. To me, that's a very serious
> omission in the report, and one that is very
> conspicuous in its absence.

DRGW Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Thanks all for the replies (and the pointer to the
> NTSB brief).
> Interesting about the cell phone. Should we
> expect a final report, or is this all they will
> likely publish?
> IC_2024, why would you doubt that the three-signal
> sequence would not have changed things? I think
> that one additional signal with "color" (a
> flashing-yellow) would have had a GREAT chance of
> avoiding the outcome we saw from this accident.
> Yellow gets an engineer's attention, and two
> chances of seeing it here could have saved lives I
> believe... Granted, if he missed the
> double-yellow, he still should have seen the
> diverging clear (red-over-green), but absent
> seeing any yellow, the fact that it was red/green
> and not green/red just didn't catch his attention
> (though it certainly should have). I'd like to
> hear what more rails have to say on this -- do you
> believe having a flashing-yellow prior to the
> double-yellow would have likely saved this train,
> and this engineer, from the fate that befell
> them?
> Thanks,
> -Wes
>
> IC_2024 Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
>
> > I doubt very much that an "advanced approach"
> > "approach diverging" "diverging clear" sequence
> > would've changed the outcome, here.
> > Interestingly, there's no mention about the
> > engr.'s cellphone use which was part of the
> > investigation. To me, that's a very serious
> > omission in the report, and one that is very
> > conspicuous in its absence.

Hi Wes,
Yeah, I get what you're saying and perhaps another signal might have helped, but I still think that this particular engr. lost complete situational awareness irregardless of an additional signal and there's no saving the train or the lives of those two passengers at that point unless a condr. would've pulled the air on him in time which of course didn't happen in this case--I mean 69mph. through a 10mph Xover is gross negligence and I don't care what his excuse was--you simply have to know the territory. For all of us engineers, it's called being qualified on the physical characteristics--in other words, you better know where you're at.
Simply put, this engr. certainly didn't have the right stuff to begin with and his aggressive behavior to co-workers (see his past work history at CSX) and other clues (was called "batman" by his coworkers because his belt had two cellphones and a ham radio on it) should've made it a done deal that he'd never be hired in the first place.
Yes, we are all far from perfect, but when you have lives in the balance, you better take your job pretty seriously and do the best you can and not have a cavalier, reckless approach to your work which ultimately set the stage for this man's gross error of failing to control his train's speed which led to the derailment through the Xover resulting in many passenger casualties and very regrettably two fatalities.