Passenger Trains > Final report on deadly Metrolink crash...

...comes down to signal color


http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-metrolink-ntsb20-2010jan20,0,785407.story

If the train in the picture truly has just passed those camera-facing signals and changed one from green to red, why is its headlight on as if it were coming toward the photographer instead of going away? Methinks somebody at the Times fudged the details there, though it doesn't affect the content of the article.

Train is in push-mode, inside the plant, coming toward photographer. Times screwed up the caption...if you can imagine that.

trainjunkie Wrote:
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> Train is in push-mode, inside the plant, coming
> toward photographer. Times screwed up the
> caption...if you can imagine that.


Oh no, not the Grimes putting a twist on things again, say it isn't so!

trainjunkie Wrote:
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> Train is in push-mode, inside the plant, coming
> toward photographer. Times screwed up the
> caption...if you can imagine that.

Yep sure is, they did, yes can imagine.
BTW: as quoted "Highball on a green" does NOT mean the signal was green. That is a conditional order. But hey the lawyers will sue everybody anyway.

---

I can't make out what I am supposed to see within the red circle

John Gezelius
Tustin, CA

An engineer consistent with the head and ditchlights being on meaning the caption is wrong and the train is coming not going.

Why do they even need a report? The NTSB made it quite clear only days after the accident who they intended to lay all the blame at the feet of, regardless of any evidence pointing elsewhere.

The operator of the train is what is in the circle. If it was knocking down the signal going the other way, there wouldnt be an operator in the cab car. Not to mention the headlight probably would be dim, and the ditch lights would be off also, gotta love the news, it makes me wonder, how much more stuff are they inaccurate on that Im not as familiar with, as I am with trains.

The Times has corrected the error in the caption and admits that earlier editions were incorrect.

Wow, I'm impressed that they corrected it!

Its because I wrote them an email....and this is what I got back....



Dear Mr. Martone,

Thank you for your observation regarding the description of the signal in the caption accompanying the story on the Metrolink crash investigation. The caption, written on our Metro copy desk, is indeed incorrect. The train is southbound. We will correct the error.

Regards,

Jim LaVally
Assistant Copy Desk Chief, Metro
Los Angeles Times
(213) 237-3467
jim.lavally@latimes.com

This thread so far has been about as inspiring as the comments found at the end of the Internet versions of stories for our local newspaper. Hardly any discussion about story content at all, but plenty of criticism about whether the paper screwed up a photo caption.
Regarding the story, I'd like to know how the NTSB is going to resolve the differences between the witness statements and tests done after the accident. I know there are those on this board who swear by the accuracy of the tests, but personally, I can't just brush aside the statements from -- not just one -- but what, three or four witnesses who claimed they saw the same thing?

Just something to throw out there.

Kim Heusel

KimHeusel Wrote:
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> Regarding the story, I'd like to know how the NTSB
> is going to resolve the differences between the
> witness statements and tests done after the
> accident. I know there are those on this board who
> swear by the accuracy of the tests, but
> personally, I can't just brush aside the
> statements from -- not just one -- but what, three
> or four witnesses who claimed they saw the same
> thing?

A lot of eyewitnesses said they thought they saw a missile bring down TWA Flight 800, too. They didn't know what they were seeing. Not to say that the folks who reported seeing a green signal are lying, or even that they are wrong, but any accident investigator will tell you that eyewitness reports are not absolutely reliable, because bystanders are not necessarily looking at the right things or thinking about what they would need to remember if something bad happened a minute or two later.

Of course the NTSB is going to lay primary responsibility on Mr. Sanchez. If nothing else -- even if the signal were displaying a false clear! -- he should have been paying enough attention to dump the air when he encountered a misaligned switch, instead of sending text messages to his buddies. The investigators were quite certain that his train ran through bad iron at the interlocker before the crash.

It's too bad there's no photo or video record of this accident, but things like that tend to be mandated afterward in a form of "tombstone regulation". And I, for one, would support the same sort of cockpit-voice-recording that the airline industry uses, too. Railroaders can complain about "invasion of privacy," but the fact is, it's a dangerous workplace and maybe "private" topics just shouldn't be discussed on the job.

Even more evidence that he was not paying proper attention to his job. He called the signal at CP Berenson, and knew that it indicated that the signal at CP Topanga was indicating stop, he failed to call the next signal, he sent a text message between the time he left the station platform and the time he passed the signal at CP Topanga. Three failures got him and others killed. Operating a train is serious business and requires the Engineer to pay attention and think about what he is doing. Distraction gets people killed as it did in this case. If he really saw CP Topanga as green, it should have raised questions in his mind IF he was paying attention and thinking about his job.

On the railroad I worked for, the signal bungalows had a device called a "field memory". This recorded the commands received from the computer in the dispatchers console. In the event that the main computer malfunctioned, the "field memories" in the bungalows would allow the system to be reset. They also record all commands received by the bungalow.

While there is a remote possibility of a malfunction in the actual signal mechanism which could display a false clear, which would not be recorded by the "field memory", most operating errors and signal malfunctions are recorded by the field memory as well as the central computer.

The railroad I worked for uses General Railway Signal and Safetran signal equipment, common throughout North America. I'm thinking the field memory in the bungalows is an option available from the suppliers also.

I also know that the NTSB has forensic investigators who specialise in signals and their control systems. For many years, CTC machines in the dispatching office have included an event recorder, information from which has been used in accident investigations frequently. The field memories also have been downloaded.

Another set of devices that are routinely recorded are the radio signal towers which the dispatcher uses to communicate with trains and track workers. Quite often, when a radio tower provides good coverage of the area a dispatcher is controlling, he/she will leave the tower "on" so they can monitor train and trackworker radio traffic.

In the case of the Dalehurst AB. collision between the eastbound Via "Super Continental" and a westbound freight in 1986, all of the radio conversations between Edson and Hinton had been recorded because the radio tower at Hargwen was open.

In the subsequent investigation by a Federal Judge, the recording devices related to the signal system were heavily relied upon as evidence.

Metrolink has installed inward facing cameras in all their locomotives that provide video and audio inside the cab. First railroad in the nation to do so. Cab cars will be outfitted next.

toledopatch Wrote:
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And I, for one, would support the
> same sort of cockpit-voice-recording that the
> airline industry uses, too. Railroaders can
> complain about "invasion of privacy," but the fact
> is, it's a dangerous workplace and maybe "private"
> topics just shouldn't be discussed on the job.

SOO6617 Wrote:
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> Even more evidence that he was not paying proper
> attention to his job. He called the signal at CP
> Berenson, and knew that it indicated that the
> signal at CP Topanga was indicating stop, he
> failed to call the next signal, he sent a text
> message between the time he left the station
> platform and the time he passed the signal at CP
> Topanga. Three failures got him and others killed.
> Operating a train is serious business and requires
> the Engineer to pay attention and think about what
> he is doing. Distraction gets people killed as it
> did in this case. If he really saw CP Topanga as
> green, it should have raised questions in his mind
> IF he was paying attention and thinking about his
> job.

I agree completely.

This type of accident is never black and white and caused by a single problem or failure. Even if that signal had been Green, Mr Sanchez, and to a lesser extent the conductor, have blame for not beeing attentive to the signals governing their movement. Even the conductor should have had an alarm raised with the prior signal showing yellow.

toledopatch Wrote:
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> even if the signal were displaying a false clear!
> -- he should have been paying enough attention to
> dump the air when he encountered a misaligned
> switch

Dude, that is what the Restricted Speed rule is for. I randomly check switches on greens, but if people expect engineers to check 200+ switches in CLEAR blocks throughout their shift they are smoking some pretty cool stuff. While we are required to be alert, we also have to trust the signals.



SOO6617 Wrote:
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> He called the signal at CP
> Berenson, and knew that it indicated that the
> signal at CP Topanga was indicating stop, he
> failed to call the next signal.

> If he really saw CP Topanga as
> green, it should have raised questions in his mind
> IF he was paying attention and thinking about his
> job.


Agreed, he (and the conductor) screwed up royally. But flashing yellows don't guarantee you're stopping in two signals. If (a big if) Topanga was green, what should he have done? Stop, call the dispatcher? Slow to a crawl? I get a flashing yellow at the same spot very day. 90% the second signal later is red. But if its green..."Train ---, Clear CP---," and off to 90MPH. There is no need or requirement to do anything else.

Skroo_Loose Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> toledopatch Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > even if the signal were displaying a false
> clear!
> > -- he should have been paying enough attention
> to
> > dump the air when he encountered a misaligned
> > switch
>
> Dude, that is what the Restricted Speed rule is
> for. I randomly check switches on greens, but if
> people expect engineers to check 200+ switches in
> CLEAR blocks throughout their shift they are
> smoking some pretty cool stuff. While we are
> required to be alert, we also have to trust the
> signals.

Dude, I wouldn't expect the ability to stop short of a misaligned mainline switch had he seen one while running on a green. But I would have expected him to dump the air upon seeing such a switch, which if I recall the reports correctly, didn't happen. And while I wouldn't expect an engineer to keep his eyes glued to the rail 100% of the time the train is moving, if you're going to pay any attention at all to the route you're running, places where multiple tracks converge would be a good place to start.