Passenger Trains > US Atty: LIRR employee falsified inspection, led to derailment

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Thursday, March 18, 2021

Former Long Island Rail Road Employee Charged with Falsifying Inspection Report

Defendant Falsely Documented Inspection of Rail Bond Subsequently Linked to 2019 Derailment in Speonk

Earlier today, a criminal complaint was unsealed in federal court in Brooklyn charging Stuart Conklin, a former employee of the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), with making a false entry in a railroad inspection report required to be maintained by the LIRR under United States Department of Transportation regulations. Conklin surrendered to federal authorities earlier today, and his initial appearance is scheduled for this afternoon before United States Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes, Jr.


Seth D. DuCharme, Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York; Daniel M. Helzner, Acting Special Agent-in-Charge, U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General, Northeastern Region (DOT-OIG); and Carolyn Pokorny, Inspector General for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, announced the arrest.


“As alleged, Conklin’s false inspection report endangered passengers on a heavily used line of the Long Island Rail Road and potentially placed scores of riders in harm’s way,” stated Acting United States Attorney DuCharme. “Today’s arrest sends a strong message that this Office is committed to ensuring integrity in reports that are critical to the safe operation of the transport system.”


“This investigation demonstrates our commitment to maintaining the safety and integrity of commuter rail systems in New York and around the country,” stated DOT-OIG Acting Special Agent-in-Charge Helzner. “Working with our law enforcement and prosecutorial partners, we will continue to hold accountable those individuals who are responsible for inspections and oversight when their neglectful actions compromise the safety of the traveling public.”


“It was an unconscionable betrayal to all New Yorkers for this signal inspector to allegedly claim a critical piece of Long Island Railroad infrastructure was safe when he didn’t even bother to look at it," stated MTA Inspector General Pokorny. “This is yet another example of why the MTA must stop relying on honor systems and implement systemic reforms to verify that claimed work was actually completed. By falsifying federally required documents, this individual put many riders at risk and it is a miracle no one was critically injured because of his actions.”


As alleged in the complaint, Conklin was employed by LIRR as a Signalman and his responsibilities included performing regular inspections of rail bonds. Rail bonds are electronic jumpers around joints in the rails of a railroad track to ensure continuity of conductivity for signal currents. Conklin completed an inspection report indicating that he had inspected a particular rail bond on April 26, 2019, and that the bond had passed inspection. Video footage from a LIRR camera showed that Conklin in fact did not inspect the bond during his shift that day.


On May 25, 2019, at approximately 3 a.m., a westbound LIRR train collided with the rear of an eastbound train that had pulled onto a sidetrack to permit the westbound train to pass. A subsequent investigation by the LIRR determined that the rail bond Conklin had falsely indicated he had inspected on April 26, 2019, was broken and was the cause of the derailment. Conklin submitted a handwritten letter of resignation six days after the derailment.


The charge in the complaint is an allegation, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. If convicted of the charge, Conklin faces up to two years in prison.


The government’s case is being handled by the Office’s Public Integrity Section. Assistant United States Attorney Turner Buford is in charge of the prosecution.


The Defendant:


STUART CONKLIN
Age: 63
Magnolia, Texas

E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 21-MJ-329

https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/former-long-island-rail-road-employee-charged-falsifying-inspection-report



Edited 2 time(s). Last edit at 03/18/21 18:00 by GenePoon.

On the one hand, if he truly did this, I hope he faces the consequences and justice is done. On the other, why would a loose connection cause a false proceed indication? I'm guessing I'd have to read the report, but as far as I knew, signal systems were designed so that no current indicated occupancy. I've seen that out here in Atlanta, a broken rail during some frigid temperatures not only caused a grade crossing to activate, but the dispatcher was seeing a track light (occupancy) on that segment.

FRA reports says a signal malfunction caused Memorial Day weekend crash on the Long Island Rail Road

RT&S
Oct.31, 2019

by Bill Wilson, Editor-in-Chief

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) says a Memorial Day weekend collision involving two Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) trains was “a signal-caused accident.”

More than 30 passengers on the eastbound train had to be evacuated on May 25 in Speonk, N.Y., following the collision, which caused a derailment.

A westbound train moved into a side track to allow the eastbound train to pass. The side track could only hold 13 cars, and the westbound train was 14 cars long. A signal indicated the train cleared the main track. The engineer of the eastbound train received the clear signal and was five car-lengths from the westbound train when he noticed the problem and applied the emergency brake. The train hit the left side of the diesel locomotive that was partially on the side track.

According to the FRA, “the accident occurred because of the loss of shunt, which allowed the main track side of the turnout to release (to become energized), allowing the eastward signal on the main track to display at SK2.

“Examination of the turnout area of the switch revealed a non-insulated rail joint that had a single broken bond. With Engine No. 512 occupying the track circuit, the track relay was able to energize. This released the interlocking and allowed the Babylon East block operator to re-align the switch to the normal position and establish a proceed signal for train No. 8700.”

An LIRR assistant signalman is now under criminal investigation, preventing the FRA from conducting an interview. The FRA wants to know if an inspection of the track circuit that was supposed to take place in April was done properly.


https://www.rtands.com/railroad-news/fra-reports-says-a-signal-malfunction-caused-memorial-day-weekend-crash-on-the-long-island-rail-road/


It would appear that Mr. Conklin is toast...



Edited 4 time(s). Last edit at 03/18/21 20:02 by GenePoon.

An inspection in April, and an accident on May 25th?  It seems like the shunt could have easily been damaged in a months time.

That may be presented in his defense but it doesn't matter. 

Conklin's wrongdoing was not causing the train wreck, but in saying he did the inspection when in fact he did not.  The wreck caused him to get caught when investigators reviewed video that showed he didn't do the inspection.

One DM locomotive was totaled with a warped frame. 

It looks like the railroad lucked out to find 
someone to blame the accident on. Case 
closed, move on, nothing to see here folks, etc
Missing bond wires would cause the track circuit to
de-energize and display a restrictive signal.

The linked RT&S article in an above post has an interesting
quote from the FRA which shows the lack of knowledge
of one or both parties: "the accident occurred because of
the LOOSE of shunt......". The correct term is "LOSS of
shunt".  Perhaps deliberate obfuscation on someone's part
to confuse the low information public into believing a loose wire
caused the problem.

I saw a similar "loose wire" excuse used by my 
local government railroad after a train was caught 
on camera going through a crossing at full speed 
while the gates were up.

Was that siding used often or was it a rusty rail
situation?  Perhaps a design fault in the CP layout?
More likely, the proper shunt tests were not made, 
which may implicate those higher up in the food chain.



Edited 3 time(s). Last edit at 03/19/21 06:09 by Englewood.

It is an active siding, but can only be used for a passing meet of trains under 12 cars, which is true of all trains except the summer Montauk Cannonball consist. That train was running late deadheading west. The passing meet is normally done in Mastic-Shirley, farther west. In Speonk, it should have been a saw-by move. 



Edited 2 time(s). Last edit at 03/19/21 07:58 by joemvcnj.

Englewood Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> It looks like the railroad lucked out to find 
> someone to blame the accident on. Case 
> closed, move on, nothing to see here folks, etc

“This is yet another example of why the MTA must stop relying on honor systems and implement systemic reforms to verify that claimed work was actually completed..."

Agree with your point. It's safe to speculate that Mr. Conklin wasn't the only beneficiary of the "honor systems" that allowed other people to be slackers. 

The MTA is having a terrible time with their new punch clocks. Seems these new fangled devices keep breaking.

MTA overtime abuse / lack of proper staffing has been a tabloid punching bag for decades.

Posted from Android

MattW Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> I'm guessing I'd have to read
> the report, but as far as I knew, signal systems
> were designed so that no current indicated
> occupancy. I've seen that out here in Atlanta, a
> broken rail during some frigid temperatures not
> only caused a grade crossing to activate, but the
> dispatcher was seeing a track light (occupancy) on
> that segment.

It's been a long time, so I had to think about it for a bit and resurrect dim memory. Turnouts are a special case. A track circuit has a battery at one end and a relay at the other. A turnout has three ends, and the rails that have opposite polarity cross at the frog (model rialroaders have this problem). The battery and the relay are on the straight side. To prevent the track from shunting itself, the diverging side has insulated joints on both rails between the points and the frog. That leaves no battery power, and effectively no track circuit, on the diverging side. The diverging side rails are connected to the straight side rails of opposite polarity (left straight rail to right curved rail by long bond wires, right straight rail to left curved rail by the frog). Loss of the long bonds means no track circuit on the diverging side of the turnout. The rail head bonds are fail-safe. The turnout bonds are not.

TAW



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 03/19/21 10:19 by TAW.

Thank you, TAW...basically, for the signal system to shunt at that particular segment of rail at the turnout, an intact bond is vital. With no intact bond there is no way to "see" a wheel on it, and thus no shunt. The occupancy of that segment becomes invisible if the bond wire is broken.

I had to run it past a retired Amtrak track supervisor...

Now, somebody is going to say that he was unlucky to skip inspecting that particular vital bond wire. No, he was wrong to have skipped any of them at all.



Edited 3 time(s). Last edit at 03/19/21 16:53 by GenePoon.

Referring to my copy of "Railroad Operation and Railway Signalling" by Edmund J. Phillips Jr.
published by Simmons-Boardman Books, Inc., I see on page 26 a diagram on switch track 
circuits.

If I am reading the diagrams correctly, there are two ways to wire a turnout.
The safest is the series connection.  In this the current flows from the battery
end to the opposite end of the main track circuit.  The current then uses two
cables to connect to the siding side of the turnout.  The current then flows through
the track relay which is just inside of the frog on the siding side. If I am following it
correctly, in the series set up the loss of the cable or "bond" connecting the main to
the siding would stop the flow of current to the battery causing the track circuit to
drop out.

Whether the Long Island wires their turnouts using this method or not, it does show that
there is a fail safe way of handling it.

Englewood Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Referring to my copy of "Railroad Operation and
> Railway Signalling" by Edmund J. Phillips Jr.
> published by Simmons-Boardman Books, Inc., I see
> on page 26 a diagram on switch track 
> circuits.


Thanks. Mine is somewhere I can't get to. I was going from memory on signal plans I worked with within the past decade, refreshed by finding a Caltrain turnout bonding diagram via Google.

The way you described is much safer (and dim memory tells me that's the way I learned when a Santa Fe maintainer taught me signaling 55 years ago or so)...but probably costs a couple of bucks more.

TAW

Englewood Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Referring to my copy of "Railroad Operation and
> Railway Signalling" by Edmund J. Phillips Jr.
> published by Simmons-Boardman Books, Inc., I see
> on page 26 a diagram on switch track 
> circuits.
>
> If I am reading the diagrams correctly, there are
> two ways to wire a turnout.
> The safest is the series connection.  In this the
> current flows from the battery
> end to the opposite end of the main track
> circuit.  The current then uses two
> cables to connect to the siding side of the
> turnout.  The current then flows through
> the track relay which is just inside of the frog
> on the siding side. If I am following it
> correctly, in the series set up the loss of the
> cable or "bond" connecting the main to
> the siding would stop the flow of current to the
> battery causing the track circuit to
> drop out.
>
> Whether the Long Island wires their turnouts using
> this method or not, it does show that
> there is a fail safe way of handling it.

And yet the FRA allows parallel shunt...WHY??? As risk-averse as the FRA is, why do they allow such a glaring safety hole? Everything I've ever read about signaling systems and track circuits, until now, indicates that any break in any wire or rail or anything of the sort, should drop the system to its safest state, in this case showing "occupied." It also seems that inspections don't have to be done all that often...for a safety-sensitive piece of hardware with no fail-safe...WHAT!?!? It seems that the FRA has some severely mis-placed priorities. They like to clutch their pearls over passenger cars not being built of battleship-grade armor and weighing a trillion tons, but they let such a glaring safety hole, with a standard alternative, to go on for how long? Look I get it, this is one of the very few incidents with parallel-wired switches, but Chatsworth was one of very few incidents with cellphones, Lac-Mégantic was one of very few incidents from brakes not being tied on properly, Big Bayou Canot was one of very few incidents from barges being lost in the fog. It only takes one to turn dozens of people's lives upside down.

MattW Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> On the one hand, if he truly did this, I hope he
> faces the consequences and justice is done. On the
> other, why would a loose connection cause a false
> proceed indication? I'm guessing I'd have to read
> the report, but as far as I knew, signal systems
> were designed so that no current indicated
> occupancy. I've seen that out here in Atlanta, a
> broken rail during some frigid temperatures not
> only caused a grade crossing to activate, but the
> dispatcher was seeing a track light (occupancy) on
> that segment.

If I recall correctly, bond in question was visibly disconnected from one side of the joint in the track in imagery available on Google Earth street view from the adjacent grade crossing last year.  If you look now, you can see the shiny new head bonds that were installed in their place.

The loose bond probably allowed a false clear occupancy circuit to be shown in the turnout after it lost shunt as I explained on here:

https://www.trainorders.com/discussion/read.php?4,4894111,4894374#msg-4894374

In all likelihood a rusty and open standard track joint without bonds acted as an insulated joint and the outside rail was already insulated at the turnout, so the tail of the diverging route became a dead island circuit with no track leads, allowing a clear signal to be displayed and the turnout thrown.  I haven't read the report thought, so that is just my original guess I discussed after looking at the location.