Passenger Trains > "Catastrophic Failure" Amtrak 351/353 Fiasco Timeline

This is appalling. It has already been shared to scores of interested parties.


Timeline of the Michigan disaster. It's even worse than I thought.


You may have seen this timeline description of the disaster on October 7th. This seems to be the best summary of what happened to Trains 351 and 352 on October 7th.

We should be concerned that this could happen again.

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Subject: "Catastrophic Failure" Amtrak 351 / 353 Fiasco Timeline

What follows is a timeline of the events surrounding the catastrophic service failures suffering by passengers on Amtrak Trains 351 and 353 on October 7, 2022. Every effort has been made to accurately represent times and situations, but there are still things I do not know. Given Amtrak’s dishonest characterization of this fiasco as a “Circumstance … out of our control,” please feel free to forward this as widely as you feel appropriate. Amtrak’s management will only behave acceptably when they understand that they they are actually beholden to their customers, frontline employees, and the congressional representatives and State DOT’s who authorize their subsidy checks. Unchecked arrogance and dishonesty has no place in Amtrak’s management structure.

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0505 CDT: Train 353’s outbound crew from Battle Creek to Chicago marks up in Chicago, starting the clock on their Hours of Service (HOS). This crew takes a van to Battle Creek.

0543 EDT: Train 351 departs Pontiac on time and proceeds to make all the normal station stops between Pontiac and Ann Arbor. The train loses a slight amount of time at most stops; indicative of a healthy passenger load but an unrealistic schedule.

0727: Train 351 departs Ann Arbor 13 minutes late.

0750: Train 351’s outbound crew from Battle Creek to Chicago marks up in Battle Creek, starting the clock on their HOS.

0747-0802: Siemens Charger ITDX 4613 shuts down at CP 52, east end of the Chelsea siding, 0 mph. Crew is able to restart the unit.

0807: Amtrak Train 351 is again moving westbound at CP 56, west end of the Chelsea siding, 73.5 mph.

0810-1215: IDTX 4613 dies for a second and final time. Attempts to restart are wholly unsuccessful. IDTX 4613’s computer reports the situation as “catastrophic failure.” Train 351 remains stationary at MP 58 with no HEP (Head End Power), resulting in the loss of lighting, HVAC, and restroom functions.

1110: Train 353 arrives at MP 58 for a planned rescue mission. A lengthy effort is required to connect the two trains.

1232: Trains 351 and 353 proceed backwards together, eastbound to the Chelsea siding.

1242-1411: Various activity at CP 56 while the Pontiac Road Foreman of Engines oversees operations. Train 351’s entire consist is placed behind behind Train 353’s consist. Train 351’s dead Siemens Charger remains between the powered passenger cars of Train 353 and the dead passenger cars of Train 351. Without a spare HEP cable to carry electricity from Train 353 to Train 351, passengers remain in the dark and with no working bathrooms.

Against policy set forth in Amtrak’s "Service Standards Manual," Amtrak management decides this configuration is acceptable and makes the decision to use Train 353 to tow Train 351 onwards to Chicago without HEP, dooming 351’s passengers to a trip without lighting, electricity, HVAC, and working bathrooms. It is not publicly known who, or at what level, made the decision to deliberately violate Amtrak’s established standards.

Subsequent anonymous commentary on a public forum, not factually substantiated, but reported here for context: “The Pontiac RFE … can barely walk account obesity and muscular/bone degeneration in his legs … I wonder how he can even pass the required physical … Then on top of that, he’s [sic] spends Thursday night celebrating his son’s 21st birthday by bar hoping [sic] and heavy drinking. So now he’s out trackside with a hangover and spends hours coupling up the train… Down between the equipment cussing and caring [sic] on for hours… A real laughfest unless your [sic] a passenger subject to this…”

1416: Combined trains 351 and 353 are moving westbound at MP 58, 25.3 mph

1438-1513: Unplanned stop at Grass Lake due to sticking brakes on a Horizon car. 45 minute delay to diagnose and cut out one truck. Media reports quote a passenger as saying the train smelled like burnt rubber and, “That was everybody’s breaking point."

1529-1537: Jackson station stop, where a medical emergency (nervous breakdown) is addressed. Amtrak staff move some passengers from Train 351’s dead cars to Train 353’s cars.

1601-1604: Albion station stop. Toilets are overflowing in Train 351.

1637-1707 Battle Creek station stop. Chicago-based crew boarded with the knowledge that they had roughly 20 minutes of padding to get the train to Chicago before their Hours Of Service expired. That cushion of time was immediately consumed by a lengthy and necessary bathroom break for passengers from Train 351. The combined train was reported as having no markers on departure (account of no electrical power and dead batteries on Train 351’s consist), an operating safety defect.

1711-1721: Stopped on the west side of Battle Creek to hang a flag and correct the marker issue. 10 minute delay.

1747-1753: Kalamazoo station stop. Combined train meets eastbound Train 352. Sewage is running in the aisles.

1810: Combined train passes Lawton at 109.7 mph, functionally track speed.

1830: Niles station stop (353). Light rain and wet leaves cause severe loss of adhesion on departure. The combined train averages 50 mph to New Buffalo, a typical failure for a Siemens Charger.

1906: New Buffalo station stop (353).

Amtrak management decides to have Train 352’s crew, who have arrived on 352 at Battle Creek, their scheduled crew change point, double back to catch 351/353 and bring it to Chicago. 352’s crew has many hours of service left to work.

1850-2326 CDT: Near CP 501 East Chicago, crew runs out of hours of service at 1850 CDT. Relief crew from 352 is expected to have things moving around 1930. Amtrak is also sending 354’s crew to the site. Crews distribute glow sticks to passengers as emergency lighting. Toilets are well overflowing and sewage is running in the aisles.

Attempts to move the train are foiled by an air brake problem with 351’s dead locomotive. Not enough power remains to successfully activate the IDTX 4613 Charger’s computer such that the “dead engine feature” can be reactivated. The Siemens troubleshooting guide does not cover this issue and the relief crew followed what steps were available in the guide. Nothing works. Chicago mechanical is contacted at 1900 but fails to arrive until 2300.

Passengers have been traveling on a non-functional train with overflowing sewage for nine hours. They are in the dark, without heat, and without any clear reassurance from Amtrak management that there is a plan and a schedule for getting them out of this situation.

Media reports state that some passengers are having panic attacks and screaming. Roughly TWO HUNDRED passengers elect to leave the train of their own accord, against the requests of the crew. The crew is both prevented by policy from opening the doors for them and prevented by policy from physically restraining the passengers. The passengers are able to use Amtrak-provided emergency exit instructions to leave the train. The crew immediately notifies Norfolk Southern to have them stop freight traffic in the area. They are unable to contact the trains of an adjacent steel mill railroad. The passengers navigate an unfamiliar industrial landscape in the dark, wade through chest-deep weeds with their luggage, and crawl through a hole in a chain-link fence. They use their own resources to summon ride-sharing services, paying upwards of $200 to escape the fiasco.

Subsequently a dishonest statement from Amtrak spokesman Jason Abrams described this as, “Some passengers elected to safely detrain in East Chicago (Indiana) and find alternate transportation.” Absolutely nothing was safe about it.

2300-2315 CDT: Chicago mechanical arrives, patches electricity to the dead engine, and resets the “dead engine feature.” The combined train is able to move again.

2334 CDT: Hammond station stop. The temperature is 45F.

0004 CDT 10/8/2022: Arrival in Chicago, 13 hours late for train 351 and 6 hours late for train 353.

Amtrak spokesman Jason Abrams inaccurately reports this as “seven hours late” to one media outlet and described the whole situation as, “Despite our best efforts, there are times when circumstances arise that are out of our control.”

--------------

What, exactly, was out of Amtrak’s control? Casual analysis would suggest that leaving 351’s dead engine at Chelsea would have cost several hours but delivered all passengers to their destinations with restored HEP. No overflowing toilets, no irate passengers, no black eye to Michigan’s corridor services, no national media humiliation. But that was not the course Amtrak management chose…

What if Amtrak decided they needed to return the dead engine from Train 351 to Chicago for repair without endangering the comfort and safety of the passengers? They could have moved the dead engine to the rear of the combined trains and towed it to Chicago, again at the cost of several hours but without all the fiasco. It would be “another day in Michigan” and not “national news.” Or if they were unable to do that switching maneuver, they could have acknowledged the emergency they were facing and contracted for busses to meet the train in Jackson. Amtrak management had SIX HOURS to make alternate arrangements. They fiddled, and those were not the courses they chose…

Well into the crisis, competent management could have looked at the pieces on the chess board and strategically switched crews between the combined Trains 351/353 and Train 352 at Kalamazoo. The crews from the combined train had enough remaining HOS to get Train 352 to Kalamazoo. The crew from Train 352 had more than enough hours to get to Chicago, and after lengthy delay, did indeed catch back up to the combined train and bring it to Chicago. That was further grief and annoyance for those passengers, and Amtrak management could have chosen to avoid that, but did not. They left the passengers with one final insult, one final breakdown, literally and figuratively in the dark, to make their own decidedly unsafe exodus through a dangerous industrial environment and pay their own money to get to their destinations.

It was through good fortune alone that this situation did not escalate further. Aside from sewage running in the aisles, any actual medical emergency is much harder to address in the dark on a train that can’t be moved. Pleading tweets to Amtrak were met with boilerplate nonsense. Crews were left with no answers from management and in the company of hundreds of justifiably hostile passengers. If a passenger had severely injured themselves fleeing the train, the entire nature of this discussion would change. Amtrak was only one speeding freight train or passenger tripping on their flip-flops from that outcome. Can you imagine how many lawyers would descend at that point? What would it cost taxpayers to settle those lawsuits?

The allegation of an incapacitated Road Foreman of Engines taking hours and hours to connect the trains together is something that must be investigated from within and outside of Amtrak. The allegation is unproven but aligns with the timeline. Still, even after the train was off his territory, Amtrak management continued to make terrible decisions. These managers are hiding behind the spokesman’s lie that all these circumstances were out of Amtrak’s control. The obvious truth is that it is Amtrak’s management that is out of control. The “catastrophic failure” wasn’t only the Siemens Charger, but the progressively more inept decisions from Amtrak management that amplified a routine failure into an actual catastrophe.

Amtrak’s Twitter account used a variety of cut-and-paste boilerplate to respond to desperate and irate customers from Trains 351 and 353. One version ends with, “We hope we can restore your faith in us.” Restoring faith in Amtrak goes beyond making those aggrieved passengers whole. It requires a transparent and public explanation of what went wrong, who failed the passengers, and what steps Amtrak is taking to prevent this from happening again. Not just steps to prevent the type of fiasco of that gets national headlines, but the continuous little aggravations that passengers suffer through on a daily basis. Not lies that Amtrak bears no responsibility for this. This type of change requires reforming the corporate culture to one that is focused on all Amtrak customers, not just those on the Northeast Corridor. This requires more intense oversight from the Department of Transportation and the various State DOT’s who cut the checks for corridor services. Amtrak has performed acceptably in the past and should be capable of returning to higher standards. If not, there are various private entities who would be willing to tackle the job. Amtrak’s dishonesty and arrogance in painting the Train 351 fiasco as “a circumstance outside our control” belies an out of control attitude undeserving of public trust. Amtrak cannot willfully endanger their passengers and lie to the public. They MUST do better.
_._,_._,_

What a mess... ugh

Posted from Android

Gardener should be fired. It's ultimately his responsibility.

SanDiegan Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Gardener should be fired. It's ultimately his
> responsibility.
Gardner and his cronies should have been fired years ago.  He is and has always been the wrong person in charge of Amtrak.  There are 2nd graders out here who could make better decisions than those clowns running Amtrak.  Things will never improve as long as those kinds of nitwits are running Amtrak.  Congress, when are you going to wake up to this situation?
John in White Marsh, Maryland

 A Charger engine already having a "catastrophic failure?"  Time will tell if these engines were a good purchase....I won't say more, but I could, based on other Charger reports.

And Amtrak has a lot more equipment coming from Sieman's. I sure hope they have learned that the procurement must include an effective and aggressive onboarding maintenance/service agreement. An appalling and really sad read of events. Overall, Amtrak will be dismissive of this events (voucher their way out of it), and there will be no consequece.......   



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 10/15/22 03:01 by jp1822.

What consequences do I think there will be ? - absolutely nothing.

• NTSB - not their issue, no one got killed, no trains crashed. 
• FRA - possible inquiries into Amtrak's own rule-breaking, but in the end, nothing.
• Amtrak Board - out of sight/out of mind - it's west of Harrisburg. Coscia doesn't care, not a Gateway real estate issue, Buttigieg is off on EV factories and urban freeway issues. Deputy Sec'y Trottenberg is in La La Land.
• MDOT - sleeping soundly, and wouldn't have the gumption to retaliate by rescinding subsidies for management firings and reforms even if they were awake. 

Amtrak will simply voucher their way out of it and pull out their PR response scripts, and the Snakeoil Salesman Gardner will go on lying they are ready to add more corridors. Multi-hour standings will happen again and again, and again, just like the Regional and Crescent trains in Virginia, just like the Acela train stuck near Sunnyside last winter.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 10/15/22 04:10 by joemvcnj.

I've said it before and I will say it again, Amtrak crews are incapable of making simple repairs or "switch" moves. MU'ing a train together while more difficult with extra MU and power is not rocket science. I will say that setting up a engine Dead In Tow is something mechanicle needs to do on most if not all class 1's. I highly doubt a class 1 RFE is capable of doing it. If there was a place to do it they should have just set the dead engine out and combined the trains without it. 

Amtrak needs a remedial program for basic moves like simple set outs, engine moves or even knowing basic hand signals.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 10/15/22 05:37 by Pacific5th.

PRICELESS... Absolutely golden post, This is why the internet was invented. May those PAX unite and erect gallows with MOW equipment.

coach Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
>  A Charger engine already having a "catastrophic
> failure?"  Time will tell if these engines were a
> good purchase....I won't say more, but I could,
> based on other Charger reports.


I hate to break it to you, but even brand new GEs and EMDs suffer catastrophic engine failures...

Seems to me the biggest issue, the HEP and sewer on 351 (and the brake issue caused by lack of power to the dead engine could have been prevented by having a spare HEP cable and failing that pull the cable from between the last 2 cars to use between 353s last car and 351s motor. Loosing power on one car beats loosing it on an entire train.
The end result for me is that the NRPC should end up loosing their state operating contracts as well as the various state DOTs witholding payment for services not rendered just like any other contract. Its not just this incident but hundreds that have taken place over many years This was a state owned engine that failed but how it was handled goes directly to NRPC's gross incompetence.

Posted from Android

They probably should have parked 351's equipment at Jackson, and offered either standing room only seats on 353, or alternate transportation/hotels for the remeaing passengers.  That trainset was simply unsafe and unsanitary to be carrying passengers.  I imagine, I would have been with the group of 200 that bolted.  Advancing to Hammond-Whiting station would have helped, although I understand that the crew was out of hours.  Remember in Planes Trains and Automobiles, where the passengers walked across the farm field!  With Google maps & the Uber app on most people's cell phones, I guess they at least felt confident that they knew where they were going!

Pacific5th Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> I've said it before and I will say it again,
> Amtrak crews are incapable of making simple
> repairs or "switch" moves. MU'ing a train together
> while more difficult with extra MU and power is
> not rocket science. I will say that setting up a
> engine Dead In Tow is something mechanicle needs
> to do on most if not all class 1's. I highly doubt
> a class 1 RFE is capable of doing it. If there was
> a place to do it they should have just set the
> dead engine out and combined the trains without
> it. 
>
> Amtrak needs a remedial program for basic moves
> like simple set outs, engine moves or even knowing
> basic hand signals.

If needed the dead engine feature does usually need to be enabled by mechanical people as we engineers don't usually know exactly which knob or valve it is....and we are generally verboten anyway....still in a pinch if I could identify it with mechanical desk help I could operate it. But....so long as I can use the M/U cable to get lights and what not on the rear...and of course if's a pax train you need to get HEP all the way through...but even if you can't enable the dead engine feature...you can cut out the air on the trucks....it's barely kosher but the cutouts are there for a reason...to move an engine that won't move any other way. WIth them cutout, any inability to put the engine into trail due to electrical failure is mitigated and brake pipe air will just saunter through to the train.



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 10/15/22 09:49 by engineerinvirginia.

Just a few questions / comments. I am sure others can add to the list.  I will probably think of more
as the day goes by.  FWIW I actually worked for amtrak for 10+ years and actually dispatched,
chief dispatched trains for other roads.

Why does 353's crew for the train out of Battle Creek go on duty in Chicago and taxi to Battle Creek?

Is it because the ongoing train cancellations would require lengthy stays in Battle Creek?
Or was it a one-off because of a crew management failure?

Anyone remotely familiar (this rules out the NOC) with a journey on I-80/94 knows it is as much of a crap shoot
as a ride on amtrak.  You could sit in traffic for hours and hours as the result of one of the many semi-truck
crashes, tip-overs, fires, etc. Anyone with any sense would deadhead the crew to BTL and let them get their
rest there before heading back to Chicago. I hair-raising ride in a DUI or XCON cab company van would 
certainly require rest after the journey..

I assume from the report that at Chelsea  No. 351 was between the siding switches.
The natural "old school railroad" move at Chelsea would have been to have 351's
engineer set up his engine for trail, HEP throughput, etc  Then when 353 arrives
have 353 cut off from its train, reach over and tie onto 351's train and double back to
353's train. I would realistically say it would take an hour. Any unexpected trouble and
it can take much longer.  I remember a Chicago Railroad Superintendent's trip from
Chicago to Battle Creek.  After the engines ran around the train it took about an
hour to get the HEP to work again. 

Remember that a lot of amtrak crews may have little or no experience in switching
cars, setting up locomotives etc.  I will probably once again be criticized by those who were 
not around in the old days but setting up a locomotive for tow was second nature back then.
Can someone fill me in on  why the "dead engine feature" had to be set up or is that the same
thing as setting up for tow just infinitely more complicated with computerization?
Are these things covered "hands-on" in the annual "training" that T&E receive?  Or is the training
all "book-learning"?  Airline pilots on here will probably confirm that their periodic training heavily
emphasizes "out of the ordinary" situations.  

Is it possible for an axle to lock up on a Charger as could happen on an E unit or F40?
If so was an employee riding the dead unit? Back in my day after Tonti and some close calls
if an engine was in a position or condition where wheel slip / slide warnings could not be received
in the control cab an employee had to ride the dead unit.

Is there a separate back-up, long lasting, battery that is dedicated to keeping the computer alive?
If so why did it not work?  If not, why not?  Have the clowns at HQ ever had the battery give out
on their laptops or I-phones and wonder what would happen on a locomotive?

Obviously someone at amtrak, probably in the mechanical department was enraptured with the 
idea of everything being computer controlled and thereby not having to be maintained.  Obviously
there are some things that should be manual and not routed through a computer.  

4 hours for Chicago mechanical to drive from 14th St. to E. Chicago?  That should get a 
"deep dive" investigation of its own. I would like to see a role call of who responded.
Any managers head to E. Chicago from home or were they just "in contact' via cell phone?

The NTSB will do nothing.  They will wait until something similar happens on a 100 degree or -20 degree day
and people die. Or perhaps a passing freight train wipes out a dozen customers.

Has NARP received a reply to their soft ball questions.  I suggest they convene a "citizens grand jury" to get
to the bottom of this potentially life threatening incident.  Are they worried about missing lunch with the big guy
real railroaders or losing the NARP discount ?  I hope they had the proper return address on the envelope when
they sent the questions to amtrak.



 



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 10/15/22 08:12 by Englewood.

mp51w Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> They probably should have parked 351's equipment
> at Jackson, and offered either standing room only
> seats on 353, or alternate transportation/hotels
> for the remeaing passengers.  That trainset was
> simply unsafe and unsanitary to be carrying
> passengers.  I imagine, I would have been with
> the group of 200 that bolted.  Advancing to
> Hammond-Whiting station would have helped,
> although I understand that the crew was out of
> hours.  Remember in Planes Trains and
> Automobiles, where the passengers walked across
> the farm field!  With Google maps & the Uber app
> on most people's cell phones, I guess they at
> least felt confident that they knew where they
> were going!

Would have been easier and quicker to set the defective engine out and combine only the passenger cars.

Pacific5th Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> I've said it before and I will say it again,
> Amtrak crews are incapable of making simple
> repairs or "switch" moves. MU'ing a train together
> while more difficult with extra MU and power is
> not rocket science. I will say that setting up a
> engine Dead In Tow is something mechanicle needs
> to do on most if not all class 1's. I highly doubt
> a class 1 RFE is capable of doing it. If there was
> a place to do it they should have just set the
> dead engine out and combined the trains without
> it. 
>
> Amtrak needs a remedial program for basic moves
> like simple set outs, engine moves or even knowing
> basic hand signals.

Could perhaps this be the result of Amtrak having to hire a lot of brand new engineers/conductors? Amtrak might be rushing them into the field as well.

Posted from iPhone

Englewood Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Has NARP received a reply to their soft ball
> questions.  I suggest they convene a "citizens
> grand jury" to get
> to the bottom of this potentially life threatening
> incident.  Are they worried about missing lunch
> with the big guy
> real railroaders or losing the NARP discount ?  I
> hope they had the proper return address on the
> envelope when
> they sent the questions to amtrak.

I have received two e-mail blasts from NARP in the last couple of days mentioning this incident as a backdrop for a donation request, which I think is pretty tacky.

Pacific5th Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> I've said it before and I will say it again,
> Amtrak crews are incapable of making simple
> repairs or "switch" moves. MU'ing a train together
> while more difficult with extra MU and power is
> not rocket science. I will say that setting up a
> engine Dead In Tow is something mechanicle needs
> to do on most if not all class 1's. I highly doubt
> a class 1 RFE is capable of doing it. If there was
> a place to do it they should have just set the
> dead engine out and combined the trains without
> it. 
>
> Amtrak needs a remedial program for basic moves
> like simple set outs, engine moves or even knowing
> basic hand signals.

I've had to help Amtrak crews a few times with switching and lining switch point frogs... No real fault of their own other than poor training. Everyone should have to learn what to do in an emergency. 

Macster Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Pacific5th Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > I've said it before and I will say it again,
> > Amtrak crews are incapable of making simple
> > repairs or "switch" moves. MU'ing a train
> together
> > while more difficult with extra MU and power is
> > not rocket science. I will say that setting up
> a
> > engine Dead In Tow is something mechanicle
> needs
> > to do on most if not all class 1's. I highly
> doubt
> > a class 1 RFE is capable of doing it. If there
> was
> > a place to do it they should have just set the
> > dead engine out and combined the trains without
> > it. 
> >
> > Amtrak needs a remedial program for basic moves
> > like simple set outs, engine moves or even
> knowing
> > basic hand signals.
>
> I've had to help Amtrak crews a few times with
> switching and lining switch point frogs... No real
> fault of their own other than poor training.
> Everyone should have to learn what to do in an
> emergency. 

Indeed...if Amtrak employees call upon me for help they are going to get it...we're all in this together....but it so happens the pax train I encounter most you have to have long whiskers to mark up on...so I would most likley ask THEM for help!

Wolverine350 Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------

> Could perhaps this be the result of Amtrak having
> to hire a lot of brand new engineers/conductors?
> Amtrak might be rushing them into the field as
> well.

Even new conductors get 8 weeks of training at Amtrak's state of the art facility in Wilington Delaware. You would think that coupling train cars and throwing switches could be taught in 8 weeks.