Passenger Trains > The Biggest Missed Opportunity - 2

I see three missed opportunities:

1) Failure to purchase almost every available passenger car in 1971.  Amtrak had no vision of what passenger service could be.  They planned much too small.  Understandably not purchasing Pullman-Standard corten steel cars and other heavyweight cars, but the remainder ot fhte fleet could have served Amtrak well.  The HEP program should have started in May, 1972 (it was not new technology).  
2) Failure to develop Amtrak stations as the commercial center of many communities.  Obviously the city stations take care of themselves, but Amtrak, even today, can make their station a bonanza for some capitalists.  For example, Toledo, OH, has numerous possibilities, even though it is south of downtown about a mile.  And yes, Amtrak does not own many of the stations, so community partnerships would have to be developed.  Commuter stations are usually parts of Transit Oriented Development (TOD).  Amtrak needs to pursue partnerships with communities so that the railroad station is a thriving spot with multi-modal possibilites and therefore is attracitve, safe, and seen as important to the local community.  
3) Mail-express revenue could be a major augment to Amtrak's bottom line.  Amtrak needs to strike an agreement with the operating railroads, so that they would share in the revenue.  Our society has Fedex, UPS, Amazon and a host of other companies, who would gladly be Amtrak's partner on freight/passenger trains.  Such trains could depart Chicago (i.e.) late in the day and have plenty of timely express and passengers for Fargo or Philadelphia or New Orleans.  

In my opinion the Biggest Missed Opportunity was right after World War II in the late 40s.  We screwed up by creating the interstate highway system and commercial aviation without including passenger rail in the balanced transporation equation.  in 1947 railroads started being taxed and it was easy to show a loss with a passenger train vs. freight.  

If leadership had committed to high-speed rail during that time as well we would have modern high speed trains all across the country, and interstates, and airports.  Instead, we rebuilt Germany and Japan whom enjoy high speed trains.  While the streamline era was admirable in trying to attract passengers it was no where close to what happened in the modernization of other countries.  Imagine in that era of optimism what we could have accomplished.

While removing the mail contracts to passenger rail in 1967 is largely considered a death blow, it is also an example of a lack of technical innovation.  For instance, with modern mechanized technology that handles all the sorting is done in facilities large and small that are stationary.  A Railway Post Office car did this function while in motion on the line of road on a continuous basis throughout the trip.  In today's world when shipping gets heavy mail all goes through the same sorter and waits it's turn in line per say.  Whereas a modernized RPO car with mechanized sorting could be moved to areas with seasonal heavy flows.  



 

MEKoch Wrote:
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> I see three missed opportunities:
>
> 1) Failure to purchase almost every available
> passenger car in 1971.  Amtrak had no vision of
> what passenger service could be.  They planned
> much too small.  Understandably not purchasing
> Pullman-Standard corten steel cars and other
> heavyweight cars, but the remainder ot fhte fleet
> could have served Amtrak well.  The HEP program
> should have started in May, 1972 (it was not new
> technology).  
> 2) Failure to develop Amtrak stations as the
> commercial center of many communities.  Obviously
> the city stations take care of themselves, but
> Amtrak, even today, can make their station a
> bonanza for some capitalists.  For example,
> Toledo, OH, has numerous possibilities, even
> though it is south of downtown about a mile.  And
> yes, Amtrak does not own many of the stations, so
> community partnerships would have to be
> developed.  Commuter stations are usually parts
> of Transit Oriented Development (TOD).  Amtrak
> needs to pursue partnerships with communities so
> that the railroad station is a thriving spot with
> multi-modal possibilites and therefore is
> attracitve, safe, and seen as important to the
> local community.  
> 3) Mail-express revenue could be a major augment
> to Amtrak's bottom line.  Amtrak needs to strike
> an agreement with the operating railroads, so that
> they would share in the revenue.  Our society has
> Fedex, UPS, Amazon and a host of other companies,
> who would gladly be Amtrak's partner on
> freight/passenger trains.  Such trains could
> depart Chicago (i.e.) late in the day and have
> plenty of timely express and passengers for Fargo
> or Philadelphia or New Orleans.  

Please tell me that your kidding. Are you seriously going to criticize Amtrak for being short sighted in 1971?

I'm don't even know what to say about the other two issues that you cite. As a cash starved organization, Amtrak has done remarkable things with many stations over the years that otherwise would have wasted away. Mail and Express? Let's see more capital investment, more locotives, more fuel, more employees. Consumers today want same-day or one-day delivery. Do you seriously think that Fed-Ex or Amazon is going to ship products via Amtrak.

That would have been good thinking in 1971, it is as outdated as linen tablecloths, flowers, crystal, and china in the diner today.

another_view Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> MEKoch Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > I see three missed opportunities:
> >
> > 1) Failure to purchase almost every available
> > passenger car in 1971.  Amtrak had no vision
> of
> > what passenger service could be.  They planned
> > much too small.  Understandably not purchasing
> > Pullman-Standard corten steel cars and other
> > heavyweight cars, but the remainder ot fhte
> fleet
> > could have served Amtrak well.  The HEP
> program
> > should have started in May, 1972 (it was not
> new
> > technology).  
> > 2) Failure to develop Amtrak stations as the
> > commercial center of many communities. 
> Obviously
> > the city stations take care of themselves, but
> > Amtrak, even today, can make their station a
> > bonanza for some capitalists.  For example,
> > Toledo, OH, has numerous possibilities, even
> > though it is south of downtown about a mile. 
> And
> > yes, Amtrak does not own many of the stations,
> so
> > community partnerships would have to be
> > developed.  Commuter stations are usually
> parts
> > of Transit Oriented Development (TOD).  Amtrak
> > needs to pursue partnerships with communities
> so
> > that the railroad station is a thriving spot
> with
> > multi-modal possibilites and therefore is
> > attracitve, safe, and seen as important to the
> > local community.  
> > 3) Mail-express revenue could be a major
> augment
> > to Amtrak's bottom line.  Amtrak needs to
> strike
> > an agreement with the operating railroads, so
> that
> > they would share in the revenue.  Our society
> has
> > Fedex, UPS, Amazon and a host of other
> companies,
> > who would gladly be Amtrak's partner on
> > freight/passenger trains.  Such trains could
> > depart Chicago (i.e.) late in the day and have
> > plenty of timely express and passengers for
> Fargo
> > or Philadelphia or New Orleans.  
>
> Please tell me that your kidding. Are you
> seriously going to criticize Amtrak for being
> short sighted in 1971?
>
> I'm don't even know what to say about the other
> two issues that you cite. As a cash starved
> organization, Amtrak has done remarkable things
> with many stations over the years that otherwise
> would have wasted away. Mail and Express? Let's
> see more capital investment, more locotives, more
> fuel, more employees. Consumers today want
> same-day or one-day delivery. Do you seriously
> think that Fed-Ex or Amazon is going to ship
> products via Amtrak.
>
> That would have been good thinking in 1971, it is
> as outdated as linen tablecloths, flowers,
> crystal, and china in the diner today.

Amtrak did make a serious attempt to attract express and mail business in the 1990's. It was unable to attract enough business to cover costs and was eliminated. 'Nuff said about that.
Express shippers and the USPS are now in the hands of over the road and air. What business does go by rail is intermodal and priced at rates that Amtrak would find unprofitable. When the Postal Service discontinued RPO's, the 3rd and 4th class mail that remained on rail and was moved over to piggyback. REA, by that time, was struggling and also did the same. Why? Because the railroads offered them lower rates for diverting that business to piggyback service and off of more-costly-to-operate passenger trains. Delivery times were slightly slower, but most of that business that remained was not time sensitive. Higher priority packages went to trucks or air. Santa Fe did try to recapture the high priority mail and related express business with the Super C, but was unable to charge a sufficent rate to deliver a profit. It was discontinued. 

We're lucky Amtrak was starting in 71. The passenger train was dead except for mail and express business. The good trains that survived were loosing money faster than a drunk at Vegas.

I was around during and after the war and there was no such thing as HSR as we know it today. It was a totally different world and I met plenty of GIs who were put off on trains from their wartime experiences as were many civilians We put up with stuff then because of the war that woud give heart attacks to some of the critics on this board. It was called patriotism...

Bill Deaver
Tehachapi, CA

steamloco Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> We're lucky Amtrak was starting in 71. The
> passenger train was dead except for mail and
> express business. The good trains that survived
> were loosing money faster than a drunk at Vegas.

Were they really? Does anyone have post-1968 accounting figures showing actual train costs from any of the railroads? I recall the CB&Q doing a study of this a few years before that showed most of their service turning a small profit or having a small loss.

RailThunder Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> In my opinion the Biggest Missed Opportunity was
> right after World War II in the late 40s.  We
> screwed up by creating the interstate highway
> system and commercial aviation without including
> passenger rail in the balanced transporation

By 1941, 91% of all passenger miles were already by private car.  That choice happened post-1920 when the car became a product with mass availability.

> equation.  in 1947 railroads started being taxed
> and it was easy to show a loss with a passenger
> train vs. freight.  

The railway ticket tax started in 1941 and continued to 1962.

> If leadership had committed to high-speed rail
> during that time as well we would have modern high
> speed trains all across the country, and

Leadershiip from 1933 right up through 1963 was firmly opposed to any intervention in favor of the passenger train and actually actively intervened to destroy the industry. So you are really talking about completely different leadership during the New Deal-Eisenhower years.

> interstates, and airports.  Instead, we rebuilt
> Germany and Japan whom enjoy high speed trains.

The PRR started experimenting with high speed electric trains with the Pioneer cars in 1958, which developed into the Metroliner program in 1964 and received government back in 1965 for the 125 mph option studied by LTK Engineering.

The Shinkansen was initially conceived in the 1930's with early planning through 1943, but was not restarted until 1958 and went into service in 1964.  France began TGV planning in 1966, converted the concept to electric only in 1973, and opened a line in 1981. The German planning timeline was similar to France, planning starting in 1970 with construction of the Hannover-Wurzburg and Manheim-Stuttgart lines starting in 1973 and dragging on until 1991 with an upgrade of planned speed during the midst of construction upon seeing the success of the TGV.

American efforts were hindered by President Johnson choosing war in Vietnam in 1964 which bankrupted the US by 1971, ending the convertability of the dollar and leading to mass inflation, especially in oil and consruction prices.  The NECIP program eventually begun in 1976 then suffered from the subsequent money drain of the environmental approval process and government oversight process, both of which hindered the most critical works - major curve realignments in Maryland and electrification and line relocation of the Boston north end, and drained precious monetary resources from the project in favor of paper shuffling and project delays.

Outright failure and inability to execute in the NEC lead to subsequent failure to pull the trigger on building perfectly sensible routes like LA-San Diego in the 1980's and in Florida and Texas in the 1990's.  Here we are now 30-40 years of road centered development later.

>  While the streamline era was admirable in trying
> to attract passengers it was no where close to
> what happened in the modernization of other
> countries.  Imagine in that era of optimism what
> we could have accomplished.

I'm not sure most people think of the period of 1933 to 1963 as a period of optimism considering the mainstream view was one of economic depression, war, and falling behind the Soviet Union with scientific progress barely managing to allow the US to move forward during the era.

> While removing the mail contracts to passenger
> rail in 1967 is largely considered a death blow,

If this was a death blow then the passenger train system was really an express freight system with riders appended in some coaches and sleepers.

> it is also an example of a lack of technical
> innovation.  For instance, with modern mechanized
> technology that handles all the sorting is done in
> facilities large and small that are stationary.
>  A Railway Post Office car did this function
> while in motion on the line of road on a
> continuous basis throughout the trip.  In today's

The RPO was incredibly labor intensive compared to a stationary sorting facility.  It could still make sense while most Americans lived in the official territory and the near South meaning that all transport could occur overnight and within 24 hours.  It made no sense at all with the growth of the Sunbelt and far west.  A 60+ hour rail journey just between terminals coast-to-coast cannot possibly compare with air freight in 6 hours over the same distance.

Also, people don't ride on Fed-Ex and UPS planes or USPS semi-trucks.

> world when shipping gets heavy mail all goes
> through the same sorter and waits it's turn in
> line per say.  Whereas a modernized RPO car with
> mechanized sorting could be moved to areas with
> seasonal heavy flows.  

Or you can handle seasonal heavy flows by just directing more capacity to the nearest major sorting facility from those areas.

abyler Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> steamloco Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > We're lucky Amtrak was starting in 71. The
> > passenger train was dead except for mail and
> > express business. The good trains that survived
> > were loosing money faster than a drunk at
> Vegas.
>
> Were they really? Does anyone have post-1968
> accounting figures showing actual train costs from
> any of the railroads? I recall the CB&Q doing a
> study of this a few years before that showed most
> of their service turning a small profit or having
> a small loss.

Some trains probably turned a small profit on an avoidable cost basis. But at non sufficent rate to offer any hope of offsetting depreciation on their aging passenger car fleets. 
Your comment on the CB&Q is probably correct in the sense that mail and express revenue largly offset losses from passenger operations. Sure, the DZ probably made money, a few of the others as well, but not enough to cover the increasing losses from the other passenger operations. When the US Mail cancelled the contracts the bloom was off the rose and efforts to discontinue trains accelerated.

Some interesting data: Union Pacific. We will all agree it was  pro-passenger road but that road experienced an average of 20% decreases in passenger revenue per year starting in 1966. This despite all efforts to stem the tide and reduce expenses. Train consolidations, discontinuances, ect. The standards were mostly kept high, but despite all their best efforts, it was not enough. (Those who believe that 1950's style dining car service will save Amtrak should study the UP situation at the time).
SP on the other hand was mostly prepared for the coming storm and had "adjusted" their services in anticipation of what was to come. I don't have exact numbers, but the SP probably experienced a similar reduction in ridership. The difference is that SP's losses from passenger operatons (at least on a per-passenger basis) were probably lower then UP's given the SP's aggressive cust cutting efforts that had begun earlier, thus placing it in a better position.



Edited 2 time(s). Last edit at 01/23/20 10:58 by ATSF3751.

Not keeping more of the AT&SF high level equipment.

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