Eastern Railroad Discussion > CSX Explanation of Carlisle incident

Taken from CSX Fax:

At 0147 am, Feb 17th, 2001, Q24316 struck the rear end of K18815 at Carlisle Ohio (milepost BE 43.4) Resulting in a Fatality to Pilot Engineer DJ ____ (201723). Both the Conductor HD _______ (376207) and Engineer TL ______ (789381) were critically injured and taken by Life Flight to Miami Valley Hospital (Dayton Ohio).

The following facts were developed from the investigation leading up to the collision.

K18815 (92 loads/0 empties) was moving south on the main line at the south end of Carlisle meeting G84815 (0 loads/68 empties) which was taking the siding at the south end of Carlisle. Q24316 (47 loads/4 empties) heading south received a Restricted Proceed signal at the north end of Carlisle while coming down the single main line following behind K18815 at the south end of Carlisle. G84815 reported to K18815 that his rear end marker was out. K18815 called Q24316 and informed them that their rear marker was out and they were stopped on the main line at the South end of Carlisle. Q24316 acknowledged the transmission of K18815. Q24316 communicated their Restricted Proceed Signal over the radio and K18815, G84815, and tapes authenticated their knowledge of the signal at the north end of Carlisle.

At 0128 am, Q24316 OS North End Carlisle at speed of 5 mph
At 0142 am, K18815 received a clear indication at South end Carlisle
At 0145 am, Q24316 rear-ended K18815 at a speed of 32 MPH

K188 went into emergency and Condcutor O'Bannon (K18815) proceeded to walk his train. After arrving at the rear-end of his train it was apparent they had been rear-ended by Q24316.

Derailment Damages are: 2 Locomotives $800,000
3 Cars $ 45,000 (2 destroyed Ore Cars)
Track $ 5,000
Total $850,000

Further investigation revealed Pilot Engineer DJ ____ had made 117 trips up and down the Toledo Sub in his 3-yr tenure. Conductor HD ___ had made 13 trips and Engineer TL ____ had made 9 trips with his last one being 11/30/00

Has there been any word on the two injured crewmen? I hadn't seen anything since the wreck took place and wondered.

Can someone tell me the track layout at Carlisle? (I was trying to pull up the CSX Timetables page at Trainweb.com, but the site is down, whats up with Trainweb?)

If its nothing more than a siding thats one signal block long, why was the SOP when working with two long trains to allow a restricting proceed? Why not have the second train wait at the red board on the single track at the north end until the opposing movement is in the siding and the train ahead is well gone, and then the stopped train can operate on normal indication?

What was the real need behind the signal system allowing the second long train to advance into an already occupied block? Seems kind of a dumb and unsafe move with no real efficiency gain (especially when meeting an empty; who cares if it sits awhile waiting for the two loads it meets to space out again).

Carlisle siding is 11,250ft. long and tangent. The signal at the south is end one of those high B&O signals that can be seen for quite a distance. Just a guess, but perhaps the engineer from Q243 saw the clear signal in the distance intended for K188 and just forgot he was there.... Plus there is the factor of restricted speed.

Thanks K8, but it still doesn't explain why the following train was allowed to 'double up' needlessly. The crewmen might have failed to follow the rules, and such actions caused their deaths, but the signal system or dispatcher practice that allows normal (non-worktrain) trains to enter into an occupied block as a matter of standard procedure set these guys up to fail. The signal system and DS might not have caused death, but they are guilty of stupidity.

Perhaps if they eliminated the restricting aspect and went to the CR practice of Form Ds to enter occupied track, the additional workload on the DS would cause this doubling-up practice to fall out of favor.

The restricting indication would be beneficial to special trains (helpers, work trains, etc), but should not be employed to allow normal manifests to enter occupied track. It sounds like the restricting signal "tool" is being mis-used.

...allows 2 trains to fit in a siding to expedite a meet. A few minutes here and a few minutes there add up. Railroading is already too slow account of excess rules. If the rules are followed, then there is no problem with restricting. This wreck wasn't caused by restricting(crew was crawling at 5mph into the siding), it was caused by 3 members not accurately assessing and remembering information that they received, and then misinterpreting a far signal as their's. Not trying to make the crew look bad, it can happen to anyone who is not careful, perhaps they were tired, but it also wasn't the signal system's fault. The dispatcher is not an idiot, either, BTW.

Conrail used restricting signals in just the same situation, can't tell you how many times I've taken a restricting heading into a siding behind another train. We never got a Form D for such a situation, but rather for when the signal system was out or we were to enter dark territory.

A good move, but as a crew you have to take on your responsibility to think and exercise due diligence. When in doubt, go slow. Doesn't set up a crew to fail anymore than a green stoplight sets up a driver to fail. Why, if he doesn't pay attention and actually steer, his car could run off the road! If you want a system so failsafe that no crew responsibility is required, well, guess what, you've just brought in a system that doesn't need crews, thanks for the pink slip. So is entering a yard track coming off the signalled main setting a crew up to fail? That happens every time you enter a yard from a main, proceed at restricted speed looking out, why is that any different from entering a siding on restricting?

Of more interest to me is the fact that the conductor had only 13 trips in 3 years over this line. Does that mean 13 times on this line, or 13 roundtrips, thus 26 times on the line? Makes a big difference. Don't know about CSX, but NS is notorious for pushing new conductors to mark up as qualified on a line after just a few trips. Claims the conductor can run on the engineer's qualification. In light of this incident I would urge the FRA to revisit the NS's qualifying practices. Not saying the conductor wasn't truly qualified in this case, but something to consider, especially if he was new to conducting.

Well...I'm sure they recieved at Restricting Signal at the north end of Carlisle. It says they communicated over the radio this signal, so that's how they could get behind K188.

Having a restricting signal just lessens the amount of time it takes for this move. Instead of stopping and getting permission to pass the signal, they can crawl past and in-behind K188. Which they started out doing..they passed the NAS at 5 mph.

Even if they'd had a Form D or what-ever that wouldn't have assured they would haven't done what they did. They started out obeying the rules, but somewhere between the NAS and the rear of K188 they throttled out.

Now, what they should have done is had G848 let them know when the rear of Q243 cleared the Plant at North Carlisle. There was 11,250 feet (roughly) between the NAS and SAS on the main. More than enough room to fit Q243 and K188 and they could stay away from each other.

Q243 is a Toledo-Cincinnatti Train. K188 is a Lima-Cincinnatti(?) train. I think the fact the Q243's crew was only 40 some odd miles from home factored into this. They'd probably been running for awhile (Toledo is about BE 195), and were axious to get off, and therefore had a Mental Vacation.

If I had a scanner, I could post the map that was attached, but I don't so you will have to try and visualize.

Take care
be safe

Having been over part of this line myself (Lima to Toledo) and can say from the stand point of Conductor being Qualified, it would be done in as few as 13 trips.

On most road trains, if a Conductor knows the general layout of the trackage and where the sidings and absolutes are on the MAIN LINE, then I would consider myself qualified.

Engineer's must know where the hills, valley's, and all other characteristics are, and so take longer.

Where Conductor's run into trouble is when they can get a train over the road (not too hard) but then into the major Yards. Most of the time it's dark, you can't really see what you are trying to learn, and then they make new tracks without warning. I would not hesitate to call a pilot, and do so on certain jobs. If I am to go to Proviso, I will tell them I can get it to CP Hill, but need help into the yard. Usually they will oblige.

So, from the stand point of Qualification, if the Conductor did not request a pilot, then he felt he was Qualified.

Take care
be safe

Regarding the safety of restricting signals, consider this: your train on single track comes up to a siding interlocking, and you know there is a train ahead of you in the siding. Would you feel safer, and thus prefer - a) a restricting signal, whereby you control the risk as you enter the siding looking out for the train ahead, or b) a stop signal, where you have to sit and put the risk on the train heading towards you, and hope that he doesn't run the signal and head on into you. I'd rather keep the risk in my hands, I trust myself more than someone I don't know much about, don't know how tired they are, etc. Head-on wrecks are by nature more likely to be worse than rear-enders, exposes to crews to max impact versus one crew. Restricting signal actually reduces the risk for a crew.

If the siding is long enough to hold 2 trains, and the practice of doubling up is encouraged in order to expedite meets, then break the territory between the NAS and SAS into 2 signal blocks.

Bottom line, the signal system design, and the lack of infrasturture that provides efficiency while not doing everything it can to avoid the unnatural scenario of having 2 long haul manifest trains occupy the same signal block, failed the men.

The restricting is only made useful in this case because the railroad is too cheap to maximize the physical plant in a way that doesn't require any need to occupy someone elses block.

Ok...11,000 feet siding. Divide by 2 = 5,500 feet.

Unfortunately, trains on here can exceed the 5,500 mark, and therefore make a 2nd signal useless...you'd still need that restricting.

The Signal system didn't fail the crews. Everyday we take restricting signals, at some places it's the only signal you can get. You have to operate in accordance to the rules, and if you do that, then you will emerge from the block safely.

Yes, it was the crews fault one way or another. Everything was working properly (sans the EOT), and if they had followed the rules behind the signals, then this wouldn't have happened.

Take care
be safe

Sidewinder wrote:
>
> If the siding is long enough to hold 2 trains, and the practice
> of doubling up is encouraged in order to expedite meets, then
> break the territory between the NAS and SAS into 2 signal blocks.
>
> Bottom line, the signal system design, and the lack of
> infrasturture that provides efficiency while not doing
> everything it can to avoid the unnatural scenario of having 2
> long haul manifest trains occupy the same signal block, failed
> the men.
>
> The restricting is only made useful in this case because the
> railroad is too cheap to maximize the physical plant in a way
> that doesn't require any need to occupy someone elses block.

Absolute nonsense.

Let's imagine that the siding was split with an intermediate signal half-way down the siding, and that the block is occupied up to the far end of the siding. When a following train arrives at the intermediate, it can continue under the rules at restricted speed, after first stopping under some rule books. They are still expected to stop short of the train occupying the block, and the dispatcher would likely not even tell them that there was something there as a warning. If they then saw the control signal clear, they would have exactly the same circumstance as in the case of the accident where the crew was allowed past the earlier control signal.

It is still up to the crew on the following train to ensure that they don't run into anything. This is not an exceptional circumstance or unusual operation. Ocassionally traps are set, like in this case, and the crew has to be saavy enough to recognize the potential problem. From the reports of the events leading up to the incident, it appears they had all the information they needed to tell them to be careful, they just had a unfortunate lapse of judgement, which can result from many things like fatigue, anxiety, or the thought of reaching their destination. This is where both training and experience is important.

If some trains exceed that 5500 foot distance, and thus occupy both possible blocks, then the second guy doesn't pass the NAS, period. If the railroad can't comfortably or reliably hold 2 trains of varying length, then they shouldn't attempt to hold 2 at any time. Tough s*it, they take the hit in efficiency. Either they take the loss, or they cut down / extend the length of the siding to comfortably hold only one or two safely.

I take it by the lack of mid-block signals, the railroad felt the siding was too small to comfortably block it out to 2, and they didn't want to spend the money to change its length.

The difference between taking a restricting on the main vs into the yard is what played such a role here: the ability to gain speed. Nobodys notching into 8 when entering the yard. On the main, its very probable. And it was the misuse of the tool in such a place where speed is possible that amplified the result here.

Restricting sigs. are a necessary part of running. I hear that Carlisle is in a dip. Combine that with the low visual profile of the ore cars on the K train and the fact that its marker had burned out. You see the clear signal in the distance and think it is yours, but you are really looking over the top of the K train. Boom. It has happened before in NE Indiana many years ago with a coal train. Tricky circumstances plus human error.

Sidewinder wrote:
>
>
> Perhaps if they eliminated the restricting aspect and went to
> the CR practice of Form Ds to enter occupied track, the
> additional workload on the DS would cause this doubling-up
> practice to fall out of favor.
>

I'm not trying to flame you Sidewinder, but what practice would you be speaking of? In all of the time that I worked for CR, we NEVER used a Form D for permission to enter an occupied track... unless rescuing a stranded train under a special set of rules designated for that purpose. In fact, unless you are using those rules that allow for rescuing a train, the CR dispatcher's computer system will lock out Form D Line 2 authority until the track is clear.

On CR, when following another train, the most common scenario at an interlocking would be to get a restricting, or permission by the stop signal, just like the conditions prior to the CSX wreck. The biggest problem in this case appears to be the fact that the CSX train (for reasons unknown) failed to hold restricted speed in accordance with the rule. Would the crew have made that same mistake if they had seen the other train's marker in front of them? Nobody really knows except the crew, but it very likely that a flashing EOT in front of them could have made prevented a serious error in judgement.

run8 wrote:
>
> When a following train arrives at the intermediate, it can continue > under the rules at restricted speed, after first stopping under
> some rule books.

If the siding was properly block-spaced out, there should be no need for this rule. Nobody should have to pass any signals, per any rule book.

Maybe the ability to close in on a train ahead after making an intermediate stop-and-proceed should only be possible in an emergency, not as a course of daily business.

In my short time with CSX I know of several other near misses and one tragedy (Effingham)that involved restricted speed and the false assumption that the man ahead was in the clear. The near misses were saved by the conductor - and in one case a sharp conductor trainee in his 1st mo. on the job - dumping the air. Go to one engineer only crews and you will see this stuff a lot more often.

This wreck happened just a few hundred feet south of the road crossing. When a train approaches a road crossing, the headlights are supposed to be on bright, the bell ringing, and the horn blowing. It seems to me with the lights on bright, somebody should have been able to see that ore train. Maybe the engineer saw it before he was at the crossing, big holed it, and said to hell with the crossing? I don't know. It doesn't matter in the big picture of what happened, but I am curious. Downloading the engine would tell. I'm just curious when/if he big holed it.

That is why I asked about the number of trips by the conductor. Sure we can be technically qualified on a line, but if a conductor doesn't know the speed restrictions, curves, grade crossings, grades, etc.(the same as the engineer) in my opinion he's not really qualified. Yes, thats a much tougher definition than the railroads have, but in my opinion half the value of a conductor is his ability to be a cross-check on info for the engineer. Two minds are better than one. Of course I'll probably get some grief from some conductors who think its their God-given right to sleep 3/4 of the trip, that they don't have to do the engineer's job, since he doesn't do their's. But its been my experience that most engineers do think through what the conductor is doing on the ground as the conductor performs. So I'm glad to protect them, since they protect me. Its also self-protection on the conductor's part.

Again, not a criticism of the conductor in this case, just using it as a forum for discussing the issue of qualifications

In response to conductor training...When I "qualified" from Cincinnati to Lima, I was allowed three round trips. In no way did I feel comfortable out there and if it wasn't for the knowledge of the engineers I was running with, I would have been in trouble more than once. I got nine weeks training in a yard before being marked up, then when I got cut off I went on the road. Thankfully, I've managed to stay out of trouble, but it's baptism by fire.